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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff-Appellee ,
vs.

Case No- 920395-CA

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT
Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred by Section
78-2a-3(2)(i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Were the federal and state constitutional rights of

Defendant violated by finding Defendant guilty of criminal
contempt without (a) providing him proper notice of the charges
against him and penalties he was facing; (b) advising him as to
his right of assistance of counsel and appointment if he was
indigent; (c) advising him of his right to remain silent, (d)
conducting an evidentiary hearing where he could confront
witnesses and to offer testimony on his own behalf, and (e)
giving him other rights that are inherent in all criminal
proceedings?

This issue presents a question of law.

Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App.

1991).

State v.

As such, no

particular deference to a trial court's decision is required.
Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App.
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1990).

2.

As to civil contempt, were Appellant's federal and state

constitutional rights violated in the proceeding below when the
lower court failed to conduct an inquiry as to whether Appellant
was indigent and if so failed to appoint counsel to represent
him?

This issue presents a question of law.

822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App.
3.

State v. Gonzales,

1991),

Since no evidentiary hearing was conducted, was there

any evidence before the lower court to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appellant had the ability to comply with the
court's order and willfully failed to do so, thereby justifying
criminal contempt?

Was there any evidence before the lower court

to show by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant had
the present ability to purge himself of civil contempt and
imprisonment by being able to make the required support payments?
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.
4.

1989).

Did the lower court enter Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law which are legally sufficient to impose
criminal and civil contempt of court?
for the court to decide de novo.
1214 (Utah App.
App.

1991).

This is a question of law

State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d

Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah

1990), Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
5.

Did the lower court violate Article 1, Section 16 of the

Utah Constitution by imposing a jail sentence against Defendant
amounting to imprisonment for debt?
be reviewed by the Court de novo.
1214 (Utah App.
App.

1991).

This is a question of law to
State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d

Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah

1990).
7.

Did the lower court err in awarding attorneys' fee to
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the plaintiff for litigation occurring before the Utah Supreme
Court and United States Federal District Court when neither court
specifically awarded such fees?
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App.
(Utah App.

1991).

§30-3-3, U.C.A.; Riche v. Riche,

1989); State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214

Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App.

1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are
contained in the Addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable Judge
Homer F. Wilkinson finding Defendant in contempt of court
thereby causing Defendant's incarceration for thirty days in the
Salt Lake County jail.

It is also an appeal from the order of

Judge Wilkinson upon remand awarding attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff as to litigation in the Utah Supreme Court and the
Federal District Court of Utah.
Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
Because this appeal centers around the court proceedings
below, the underlying facts of this divorce action serve only as
background to this appeal.

References will be made to the record

number of both pleadings and transcripts.

For those instances

where no record number is available, the date of transcript and
page number will be utilized or a description of the document's
location will be given.

Relevant documents which are not

contained in the District Court file but which are contained in
the file of the Utah Supreme Court, or the United States Federal

District Court will be contained in the Addendum.

Finally, all

matters dealing with contempt will be underlined.
The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 26, 1974
and separated on December 26, 1987.
children during their marriage.

The parties had four

On December 30, 1987 Jeannette

Osguthorpe filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

(R.

2 ) . During the preliminary

proceedings the 1986 joint federal and state income tax forms
were entered into the record.

(R.

36-48).

These documents

showed that the adjusted gross income including wages, interest
and rental income from both parties totalled $17,371.00.
34).

(R.

Prior to trial the defendant filed a financial declaration

under oath stating that his total monthly income as of 1988 was
$2,350.00.

(R.

80-88).

During the lower court proceedings of divorce, Defendant was
represented by attorney David Dolowitz.

(R.

63-68).

On August

16, 1988 a trial was held before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson.
During the trial the 1982 through 1987 joint income tax returns
of the parties were received into evidence.

(R.

157). At the

conclusion of the trial the court awarded custody of the children
to the plaintiff subject to reasonable visitation by the
defendant.

The court ordered Defendant to pay $150.00 support

per month per child and $150.00 alimony per month for a period of
five years, then $1.00 per year for the next five years.

The

court also made various orders concerning health insurance and
personal property.

(R. 159).

Fewer than four months after the divorce trial, Plaintiff
filed a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause and sought an
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order of the court finding Defendant in contempt,

(R.

176-180).

Shortly thereafter, the attorney for defendant's attorney filed a
motion for contempt against Plaintiff's attorney on the basis
that he had willfully failed to prepare written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree in accordance with the
bench ruling of the lower court.

(R.

215-17).

In addition,

Defendant requested that Plaintiff be held in contempt for
failure to abide by the previous bench order of the court.

(R.

218-223).
Plaintiff's counsel subsequently prepared the required
documents.

On February 28, 1989 a hearing was held as to the

objections lodged by defense counsel concerning these documents.
(R. 250). The court essentially approved the Findings as written
and executed them on February 28, 1989.
the Decree of Divorce was also executed.

(R. 251-67).
(R. 269-77).

Likewise,
These

Findings and Decree form the basis for subsequent actions of
contempt which are the issue in this appeal.
On March 1, 1989 the Domestic Commissioner executed an order
ruling upon the separate motions for contempt filed by both
parties.

(R.

279-283).

the commissioner.

Neither party was found in contempt by

On March 29, 1989 Defendant appealed to this

Court various provisions of the divorce decree.

(R.

286-87).

On March 19, 1990 this Court affirmed all provisions of the
divorce decree on the basis that the lower court had not abused
its discretion.

(R.

300-03; 131 Utah Adv.

Rpt.

21; 791 P.2d

895.) This Court affirmed the lower court's decision of alimony
that the defendant had the ability to earn more than his present
income and had chosen to be employed by his father at a lower

salary.

This Court also affirmed the lower court's finding that

the federal and state tax returns appeared to understate the
parties' income during the marriage.

This Court stated:

"The trial court found that defendant was not being
candid as to his actual current income or was
purposefully under-employed. We defer to the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses....Given the evidence in the record, it was
well within the court's discretion to determine that
Defendant was either earning more than the evidence
indicated or had the ability to earn more money. 131
Utah Adv. Rpt. at 23.
Subsequently, on a petition for rehearing this Court awarded
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

This Court found, "Because

those findings [of the lower court in the divorce action] are
supported by the evidence we award Plaintiff her costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on appeal and remand to the
trial court for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees
Plaintiff has incurred on appeal." (134 Utah Adv.

Rpt. at 23; R.

299) .
On October 17, 1990 Plaintiff filed a "Verified Motion for
Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Determination of
Attorneys' Fee on Appeal, Contempt Order and Sanctions and Other
Relief." (R.

305-12).

During all of these preceding events Defendant was still
being represented by attorney David S. Dolowitz.

On October 17,

1990 Mr. Dolowitz filed a Withdrawal of Counsel.

(R. 377).

Concurrently, he also filed a Notice of Attorneys' Lien.
375-76).

(R.

On November 1, 1990 Plaintiff's attorney sent to

Defendant a "Notice to Appoint Successor Counsel." (R. 381).
On November 20, 1990 a hearing was held before the Honorable
Sandra Peuler, Domestic Relations Commissioner.

Plaintiff was

represented by attorney Kent Kasting and Defendant appeared pro
se.

(R.

402)•

At that time Plaintiff was awarded a judgment of

$22,538.00 consisting of delinquent child support, alimony,
attorneys' fees,and costs of appeal.

The commissioner certified

to the judge the issue of Defendant's contempt and ordered an
evidentiary hearing be set unless Defendant brought himself
current through November prior to the evidentiary hearing.

(R.

402) .
Defendant filed a pro se objection to the commissioner's
recommendation claiming that he had insufficient income to pay
the continuing obligation ordered by the court and had no assets
available to pay the $22,000 amount required for the purging of
contempt.

(R.

404-08).

He attached copies of his 1988 federal

income tax return to his objection.

(R.

410-26).

This

document, the federal tax return, showed an adjusted gross income
of $11,933.00.
On January 3, 1991 Commissioner Peuler affirmed her previous
decision and executed an order to that effect.

(R.

436-441).

On January 25, 1991 the Court considered the objection to the
Domestic Commissioner's recommendation.

The Court made various

orders regarding visitation, support, and personal property and
in addition "reserved for an evidentiary hearing plaintiff's
request for a finding of contempt, imposition of fine, sanctions,
and jail sentence with plaintiff being allowed to schedule such a
hearing in the future if she so desires." (R.

442; 449-55).

(Emphasis added).
On September 26, 1991 a new "Verified Motion for Judgment,
Contempt Order and Sanctions and Other Relief" was filed by

Plaintiff's attorney.

(R. 466-71).

In part, Plaintiff's

pleading stated:
Defendant's attitude of contempt for the orders of
this Court throughout the history of this case, and
since the November 1990 hearing, is blatant and
shameless. Plaintiff requests the Court impose
appropriate sanctions against Defendant, including but
not limited to sentencing him to an appropriate term in
the county jail for his contemptuous behavior. (R.
470-71).
(Emphasis added).
On October 8, 1991 the motion of Plaintiff was heard.
Again, plaintiff was represented by her attorney Kent Kasting and
the defendant appeared pro se.

The Commissioner recommended an

award of an additional $6,750 for a period of December 1990
through September 1991 of unpaid child support and alimony as
well as recommending an evidentiary hearing as to the issue of
contempt.

(R.

484; 485-87).

On October 18, 1991 Defendant filed objections to the
domestic commissioner's recommendations.

(R.

492-538).

Included in the exhibits attached by Defendant was his 1990
federal and state income tax returns.

(R.

526-35).

The 1990

federal return showed an adjusted gross income of $11,167,00.
On January 7, 1992 a hearing was held before the Honorable
Homer Wilkinson concerning the matters previously raised by
Plaintiff.

Because this hearing and its subsequent orders are

relevant to this appeal the hearing and orders will be discussed
in some detail.
On January 7, 1992 Plaintiff appeared in person and with her
attorney, Kent Kasting.

Defendant appeared in person pro se.

Prior to any evidence being taken a discussion occurred between
the court, Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel.

(R.

647-58).

no time during this preliminary procedure was Defendant advised

At

of any criminal rights he may have or as to his right to have an
attorney appointed if he could not afford one.
During the hearing Plaintiff, Defendant, Plaintiff's
attorney, Defendant's present wife, and Plaintiff's brother all
testified.

(R.

698-828).

Defendant testified that he had

insufficient financial income to keep current on his support and
alimony obligation.

(R.

757, 762-63, 778). Defendant's 1989

and 1990 income tax returns were offered and received into
evidence.

(R.

785, Exs.

15 and 16). Defendant's new wife,

Gwenda, also testified that her husband did not have sufficient
income to meet the current support obligation.

(R.

793). She

stated, in addition, that the defendant was representing himself
because they were unable to afford the services of an attorney.
(R.

795). Defendant testified that he had insufficient income

to pay for the past services of his own attorney Mr. Dolowitz and
that a lien had been filed against him.

In addition, he had

insufficient income to pay the attorneys* fees for plaintiff.
(R.

765-66).
At the conclusion of the hearing the lower court made the

following statement in rendering its opinion.

This statement is

quoted in its entirety because of its relevance to this appeal.
The Court would also find that the defendant is in
contempt of this court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5),
"disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process
of the court." The Court would further find that the
defendant has had an opportunity to have a hearing here
in the courtroom, that evidence has been taken regarding
the contempt, that his credibility is in question, he
has not answered the questions put to him truthfully,
that the only evidence the court has to go on is that no
child support has been paid since February of 1991 and
that time only
* * *

Well, you take the $375 that was paid, and of
course none was paid in January, and going back to where
he hadn't paid full child support back I guess to almost
the time of the divorce, it looks like back in March of
1989, that there is an amount of child support—and this
would have to be determined accurately—but its up in
the amount of $16,000.
Now I'm not talking about alimony or attorneys'
fees, I'm looking only at child support, and that he's
had the means to pay this child support and that he's
had a good education, he has the ability to, if he does
not have the income—and the Court even questions t h a t —
that he is paying for rent in an excessive amount
instead of paying his child support.
The Court finds that this is one of the most
flagrant violations of the law as far as support of
children that has come before this Court, and as I say,
I cannot even comprehend how a father can allow himself
to do such a thing and still claim he loves his children
and wants to visit the children.
The Court would order, pursuant to Section
78-32-10—and of course I've indicated he has been found
in contempt—that he be fined $200 and that he be
ordered to spend 30 days in the Salt Lake County jail.
The Court would further order, pursuant to Section
78-32-12 that the imprisonment is for his omission to
perform an act enjoined by law, which he is yet in the
power to pay, and that after serving the 30 days, he is
to continue to serve the time in jail until he pays the
child support as ordered by the court.
* * *

The Court would further order that the prison—or,
the jail sentence be stayed for a period of six days or
until the 13th day of January, 1992, that if the
defendant, by that time, has paid the sum of $5,000 to
the plaintiff for child support, then the sentence will
be stayed and each month thereafter that he pays child
support as ordered by the court, plus the sum of $300
towards the arrearage—or for an amount of $900—then
the jail term will be stayed.
If he fails to pay the $5,000 by the 13th day of
January, 1992 then he is to report to the Salt Lake
County jail at 12:00 noon. If he does not report, a
bench warrant will be issued for his arrest.
* * *

The alimony would have to be paid, too; I'm just
not ordering that that be paid as far as the jail. He's

in contempt of this Court as far as alimony and as far
as the obligation of attorneys' fees and all the orders
of this Court; and that should be noted for the record.
But I am purging him of the contempt if he's paid
the child support and gets the child support going, and
what you do as far as the collection of alimony, I'll
have to leave that to you. [Directed to Mr. Kasting].
(Transcript of January 7, 1992 entitled "Reporter's
Partial Transcript of Hearing on Commissioner's
Recommendation "Court's Ruling", pp. 9-13).
(Emphasis
added).
The oral order of the court was reduced to a judgment on
January 24, 1992.

(R. 549-53).

In addition, Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law were also entered by the lower court.

(R.

555-63).
In order to bring his support obligation more current and to
avoid a charge of contempt, Defendant and his current wife
applied for and received a loan from Valley Bank & Trust in the
amount of $5,000 and paid this to the plaintiff before January
13, 1992.

Defendant then filed on February 21, 1992 a "Motion to

Reconsider Judgment" on the basis that he did not have the income
to pay the $900 a month imposed by the court and that now he was
required to pay installment amounts on the $5,000 loan.
565).

(R.

The Motion to Reconsider Judgment was denied by the court

on April 3, 1992.

(R. 586).

Three months later on April 30, 1992 Plaintiff filed a new
"Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorneys' Fee and Immediate
Imposition of Jail Sentence." Plaintiff requested the immediate
imposition of the thirty day jail sentence previously stayed by
the court together with additional judgments for unpaid support
and attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff requested the following:

Defendant has again willfully and intentionally
violated the previous orders of this Court and,
therefore, is once again in blatant contempt of this

Court's previous orders and it is reasonable that he
should be ordered to immediately commence serving the
entire thirty-day jail sentence which the Court had
earlier imposed upon him but stayed conditioned upon his
complying with the payments the court required him to
make to the plaintiff and the court should issue a bench
warrant requiring the defendant to commence serving that
jail sentence forthwith. (R. 590-91).
(Emphasis
added).
On May 7, 1992 a Notice of Hearing of this Motion was filed.
It stated the following:
Please take notice that Plaintiff's Verified Motion
for Judgment, Attorneys' Fees and Immediate Imposition
of Jail Sentence will come on for hearing on the 18th
day of May, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled court. (R.
593).
(Emphasis added).
On May 18, 1992 Plaintiff's motion came before the lower
court.
A.

Plaintiff was now represented by her new attorney, Sharon

Donovan.

Defendant once again appeared pro se.

was made to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

No attempt

No effort was made

to advise Defendant of any criminal rights nor was inquiry made
concerning his financial status to hire an attorney.

Concerning

the appellant's ability to pay, Plaintiff's counsel made the
following statement:
He clearly has the ability to pay child support.
I'm sure the court is aware of the Osguthorpe farm up in
Park City, which part of it has been condemned in the
newspaper recently, and they indicated that they
received about $600,000—at least the family has—for
the widening of the road into Park City and other
property which is worth a couple of million dollars up
there with the family properties. (R. 635).
In another portion of the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel stated:
And if Dr. Osguthorpe is only making $5.00 an hour,
which I highly doubt given the amount of eduction he's
had, given his family background, they own the
veterinary clinic, they own property, he says he doesn't
have an interest in it. (R. 643).
Defendant informed the court that he had no interest in the

-12-

Osguthorpe family farm nor the income of his father.

(R. 639).

Moreover, he again asserted that his income as shown by his
income tax returns was insufficient to pay the current amount of
child support and alimony together with the past amount for
arrearages.

Defendant offered his 1991 tax returns to

substantiate this claim.

(R.

638, Ex. 2 ) .

Defendant then made the following statement:
I'm doing the best I can with the income I have. I
have no other source from which to draw and I wish I
did. I wish I did have the income. But veterinary
medicine is tough right now. It's going through tough
economic times right now. I wish I could make more to
bring this situation current, Your Honor. I've checked
on other jobs in this area, and there are none available
at this time, Your Honor. (R. 640).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the following dialogue
occurred:
THE
you
you
the

COURT: Please understand, Mr. Osguthorpe, I did let
know that you had the right to call witnesses; if
have any, or to have them take the stand, or to take
stand yourself and give any testimony.

MR. OSGUTHROPE: I didn't know today that I could call
witnesses, Your Honor. I thought this was just a motion
to show cause. I'm not familiar—that familiar with the
court system.
THE COURT: You have a right t o — i n order to show cause,
at which you have a right to bring any witnesses in to
testify. (R. 645).
The court sustained its previous order and structured the
contempt of court identically to the January contempt.

Defendant

was ordered to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail
and, pursuant to Section 73-32-12, to a continuing sentence
beyond that time in the event he did not comply with the child
support and alimony requirements.

The court stayed the order

until May 26 at 12:00 noon at which time $2,000 had to be paid to
the plaintiff.

In addition, if the monthly $900 was not paid by
-1 -*-

June 5, a bench warrant would be issued for his arrest*

(Tr.

May 18, 1992 at 2-4). After imposition of this sentence,
Plaintiff asked, "Where am I going to come up with this income,
Your Honor?" The Court replied, "Mr.

Osguthorpe, payment of

money is your responsibility which has been placed on you by this
Court and by the Court of Appeals.
I'm not telling you what to do.

As I indicated.to you before,

You do what you have to do."

(Transcript of June 18, 1992, "Court's Ruling", p. 4 ) .
On June 11, 1992 Defendant's present appellate counsel
entered his appearance for the Defendant.

(R.

606) .

Counsel

was retained by Defendant's father because of his father's
concern that his son would spend an indefinite term in the Salt
Lake County jail under the court's orders.

Subsequently, because

of certain procedural irregularities, counsel for both parties
stipulated that the May 18 order would be adjusted in order to
give Defendant time to comply.

Accordingly, the amount of

payment was adjusted to $3,050 and Defendant was given until June
24, 1992 at 12:00 noon in order to make the payment.
607-16).

(R.

On June 5, 1992 a warrant and order of commitment was

issued against the defendant.

The order stated in part:

Now, therefore, in obedience to an order of the
court made and entered on the 5th day of June, 1992 you
are commanded to take into your custody and commit to
the Salt Lake County jail Jerry S. Osguthorpe and to
confine him therein for a period of thirty days or until
such time as he shall purge himself of this court's
finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this
court's previous orders.... (R. 617-18).
(Emphasis
added).
On June 24, 1992 a Notice of Appeal as to the lower court's
decision of contempt of June 19, 1992 was filed in the District
Court.

(R.

632).

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a Motion for
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Stay of Jail Sentence pending appeal with this Court.
Addendum).

(See

Attached to this motion was an affidavit of Defendant

stating that he had been representing himself throughout the
lower court proceeding because he was financially unable to
afford an attorney.

In addition, he attached letters from Valley

Bank stating that he could receive no further loans because of
his poor credit, as well as three letters from other
veterinarians relating to the current salary of contract
veterinarians and stating that the veterinarian economic climate
was poor.

(See Addendum).

On June 24, 1992 the Honorable Russell W. Bench of this
Court entered a temporary stay order of the jail sentence pending
a hearing on the merits before a panel of this Court.
Addenum).

(See

On July 16, 1992 this Court heard oral argument

concerning the motion for stay.

The Court made the following

order:
It is hereby ordered that the Motion for Stay
Pending Appeal is denied, and the temporary stay
previously granted is vacated, based upon the court's
determination that appellant has not sufficiently
demonstrated that he would be likely to succeed on the
merits of the appeal. See Jensen v.
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987).
and
It is furthered ordered that the case is temporarily
remanded to the trial court for determination and entry
of an award of appellee's costs and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for stay.
(See Addendum).
On August 5, 1992 Defendant filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Writ with the Utah Supreme Court requesting a
review of the failure of the District Court and this Court to
stay the imposition of the jail sentence pending final review on

this appeal.

On August 13, 1992 the attorney for Plaintiff filed

a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the
issuance of a writ and concluded by stating, "Respondent
respectfully requests that the Petition for Extraordinary Relief
be denied, that no stay of the jail sentence be granted and that
Respondent be awarded her attorneys' fees and court costs
herein." (See Addendum).

(Emphasis added).

On August 17, 1992 a panel of the Utah Supreme Court heard
oral argument concerning Defendant's Petition.

On the same day a

minute entry was entered stating, "In the absence of an adequate
foundation the Petition for Extraordinary Writ is denied.

In

addition, the motion for a stay of execution is also denied."
(See Addendum).
On August 12, 1992 a second warrant and order of commitment
was executed by the lower court.

This warrant also directed the

county sheriff to confine defendant for a period of thirty days
or until such time "as he shall purge himself of this Court's
finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this Court's
previous orders relating to payment of the amount of $3,050 in
delinquent child support and alimony through June of 1992." (See
warrant contained in unnumbered pages of Vol.

II of District

Court Record).
On August 27, Defendant surrendered himself to the Salt Lake
County Sheriff.

On this same date Defendant filed a Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court of Utah claiming
unlawful incarceration.

(See Addendum).

On August 31, 1992 Defendant's father D. A. Osguthorpe and
Defendant's wife, Gwenda, paid $2,000 cash to the Salt Lake

County Jail Clerk on the representation that such money would be
utilized as bail to release Defendant from incarceration.
Defendant was released that same day.

On September 21, 1992

Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer these funds to Plaintiff
claiming that the money was properly hers and was not "bail".
See Motion to Release Funds to Plaintiff and Affidavit of Sharon
A.

Donovan contained in Vol.

II of District Court Pleadings

unnumbered pages.
On September 23, 1992 a hearing was held in the District
Court concerning Plaintiff's motion for release of funds.

At

that time Defendant called Gwenda Osguthorpe and D.A. Osguthorpe
who both testified that the $2,000 belonged to D.A. Osguthorpe
and was posted upon the representation of the Salt Lake County
Jail personnel that the money was to be used for bail and would
be returned if Defendant attended all court hearings.

(R.

667-8_2) .
During cross examination of Defendant's father, Dr. D.A.
Osguthorpe, Plaintiff's counsel directly and frankly asked
Defendant's father why he was not willing to pay the support
obligation of his son.

The following dialogue occurred:

Q. The last question I have, Dr. Osguthorpe, is: you are
quite emphathetic in your testimony that had you known
that this $2,000 might have gone towards child support,
you wouldn't have given them a dime. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Why do you feel so strongly about that, Dr. Osguthorpe?
A. You have been irritating me for the past four years. I
have omitted them from my will, and I was told that they
were going to harrass me until they got every dime I've
got, and I'll tell you that as far as I'm concerned, I
have written them all out of my will. And just because
I have a few dollars, it's no sign that I have to pick
this up all the time, and I'm not going to.

Q. I guess my question, and what I don't understand in this
case, Dr. Osguthorpe, is why you feel so strongly about
not helping your own grandchildren such as you would
write them out of your will. Is there some vendetta
against Jeannette or something of that nature?
A. No, Jeannette's father was the sole cause of this whole
divorce, and these kinds of people—they're too many
good people in the world for me to spin my wheels with
these kinds of people.
Q. So no matter what, you're not going to do anything to
help your grandchildren as far as helping to support
them, correct?
A. I'm not.

(Tr. 681-82).

At the conclusion of the hearing the lower court found
factually that both D.A. Osguthorpe and Gwenda Osguthorpe
believed that the money they were posting was for bail and that
the confusion was caused by jail personnel.

The Court noted that

it had not set bail in the matter and that there was an error by
the jail in accepting the money as bail.

The Court then stated:

Now the next question the Court has to face is:
whose money was being used? The Court would find that
the money was obtained by D.A. Osguthorpe, that it was
presented, given, loaned to Gwenda Osguthorpe, and that
she presented herself at the jail and paid the money to
the jail for the bail.
* * *

The Court is of the opinion that the money was
bail, but it was paid by Gwenda, that based on the
payment by Gwenda, the Court would grant the motion to
forfeit the bail. (R. 691).
During this same hearing Defendant's counsel argued that the
bench warrants issued by the court were ambiguous and not
consistent with the original orders of contempt.

Specifically,

counsel argued that the original orders of the court in January
and May required Defendant to serve a straight thirty days in
jail plus any additional time until he complied with the monetary

payment.

The bench warrants, however, provided that he would be

confined in jail for a period of thirty days or until such time
as he made the payments.

This wording created an ambituity which

allowed the plaintiff to argue that the contempt was purely civil
since it provided a thirty-day maximum sentence or sooner if he
paid the reuired amount.

Counsel stated he wanted this warrant

corrected in order to correctly argue in the federal action the
court's intent to utilize the criminal thirty-day statute.

(R.

694-95).
The Court in denying the motion to modify the language of
the warrant stated the following:
Well, the Court has not reviewed these orders; of
course I read them at the time, and I signed them, and I
know that there was discussion as to that first one,
whatever it was, I can't remember myself right now. But
Mr. Cook was a participant in the discussion at that
time.
And the Court does not feel that the motion now is
timely as far as changing any warrant. I would deny the
motion. And when you talk about criminal contempt, this
Court was not indicating in any way that it was a
criminal proceeding here. This has been a civil action,
and of course the contempt was a civil contempt under
the law. (R. 696). (Emphasis added).
As predicted, the County Attorney in his response to the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 25, 1992 pled as
a defense that Petitioner was incarcerated solely for civil
contempt based upon the language contained in the warrant.
See Addendum.
During this same period of time a third revised warrant and
order of commitment was issued by the court in which the Salt
Lake County Jail was ordered to confine Defendant for a period of
thirty days or until such time "as he shall purge himself of this
Court's finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this
-19-

Court's previous orders related to payment of the amount of
$3,950•00."

See unnumbered page contained in Vol.

II of

District Court file.
On September 28, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for
Judgment, Attorneys1 Fees and Other Related Matters.

This motion

was filed pursuant to the remand by this Court to determine
attorneys' fees for Defendant's attempt to stay the sentence.

In

addition, however, Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees that she
incurred in the Supreme Court action and in the Federal District
Court action.

See Motion and Affidavit of Sharon Donovan in

unnumbered portion of Vol. II of lower court record.
On October 1, 1992 Defendant was arrested outside of his
home and taken to the Salt Lake County jail for further
incarceration.
On October 2, 1992 a hearing was held in the Federal
District Court.

Judge Bruce Jenkins granted the sheriff's motion

for dismissal on the basis that Defendant should pursue a
modification of the current support order in the state court and
that appellate review of the contempt proceeding was still
pending in the state system.
on October 16, 1992.

The Order of Dismissal was executed

See Addendum.

On October 6, 1992 Defendant filed a Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Release Funds to Plaintiff on
the basis that the Court did not have authority to take the money
of Dr. D.A.

Osguthorpe which was posted for bail and to turn it

over to Defendant's former wife.
pages of Vol.

See Memorandum in unnumbered

II District Court Record.

On October 9, 1992 a hearing was held concerning Plaintiff's
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motion for judgment and attorneys1 fees.

Plaintiff Jeanette

Osguthorpe testified as to the amount which was delinquent since
the last hearing.
these amounts.

Defendant did not object to the computation of

He did, however, object to Plaintiff's request

for $3,196.00 in attorneys' fees from the Utah Supreme Court on
the basis that Plaintiff had requested attorneys' fees from the
Utah Supreme Court but that they were not awarded.

Likewise, he

objected to the award of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiff in
the federal habeas corpus action on the basis that she was not
even a party and that it was not directly related to the divorce
but was related to his incarceration.

The Court made the

following order:
I think that the argument, of course, as to the
merits was brought up by the defendant, but this Court
is persuaded that the divorce statute, Title 30, as
referred to, that it does put responsibility on this
Court for the awarding of attorneys' fees in divorce
actions.
If the Supreme Court had denied, or the Federal
Court had denied them, then there's no question this
Court would not have acted.
But I have seen—well, I shouldn't say "many"—I've
seen cases where the Supreme Court has sent cases back
for the award of attorneys' fees. I've seen cases in
divorce actions where attorneys' fees are awarded where
the Supreme Court has not made an actual award of them.
So what I'm saying is this: I'm granting the
plaintiff's motion as prayed for attorneys' fees. Of
course I don't want to create more litigation; however,
if either the Supreme Court or the Federal Court did
take the position that they did not intend to have any
attorneys' fees awarded, then of course that would
override my order here today. Otherwise, they would be
awarded. (October 9, 1992 hearing, p. 12).
In the same proceeding Defendant's counsel made the
following request:

MR. COOK: And one more, then, also, Your Honor, we
would like to have credit for the previous four days he
was previously incarcerated when he was released
erroneously as to this sentence, so that he can add that
to the thirty days; so it's the same basic sentence. It
is the same sentence; he was only released because of
the error, and therefore we believe he should be
credited for those four days.
MS. DONOVAN: I think it was a new bench warrant.
Whatever the Court thinks.
THE COURT: What does the bench warrant say?
MS. DONOVAN: Thirty days.
MR. COOK: There were two separate bench warrants.
MS. DONOVAN: Did y o u —
MR. COOK: But they're both thirty days.
MS. DONOVAN: Or earlier if you'll pay the money.
THE COURT: Well I think he's entitled to any time
that he served, the he would be entitled to that. If
that's what the bench warrant is limited to, I would
grant that. (Transcript October 9, 1992 hearing, p.
14).
(Emphasis added).
On October 16, 1992 the lower court signed an order to
credit the jail time thereby giving Defendant the four-day credit
for his previous incarceration.

See "Order to Credit Jail

Time" contained in unnumbered pages of Vol. II of lower court
record.
On October 22, 1992 Plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion for
Order Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment." The
Affidavit of attorney Sharon Donovan filed in conjunction with
such motion stated that she had learned that based upon the
Court's earlier order allowing Defendant credit for time served
that Defendant would be released on October 23, 1992 after
serving 27 days in the county jail.

The Affidavit stated, "Based

upon the language of the prior revised warrant and order of
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commitment, affiant respectfully requests that this Court extend
the jail sentence, until Defendant fully complies with paying the
$3,950 ordered by this Court."
On October 22, 1992 the Court entered its "Ex Parte Order
Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment." The new order
provided that the Salt Lake County Jail was ordered not to
release Defendant "until he fully complies with paying the sum of
$3,950 or until further order of this Court." See Ex Parte Order
contained in Vol.

Ii of unnumbered pages of District Court

Record.
As of October 23, 1992 Defendant had served 27 days in jail
based upon the contempt proceeding and was entitled to release
because of good time served.

Once the Ex Parte Order was signed

by the lower court, however, it was apparent that the previous
representations made by Plaintiff and her attorney for purposes
of defeating the claim of a criminal contempt argument were
shifting mounds of sand.
D.A.

At this point, Defendant's father Dr.

Osguthorpe, in spite of the Defendant's opposition, elected

to pay an additional $1,950 to Plaintiff for his son's obligation
and to forego any claim as to the previous $2,000 he had paid
erroneously based on bail since otherwise his son would stay
in jail indefinitely.

See "Motion and Stipulation" contained in

unnumbered pages of District Court Record Vol.

II.

Accordingly,

on October 23, 1992 the lower court ordered Defendant released
from custody and further ordered that the $2,000 being held in
dispute be released to Plaintiff.
Unbelievably, there have been no further procedural events
since the time of Defendant's release on October 23 until the
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time of the filing of this Brief approximately one month later.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Even though this was a domestic lawsuit, Defendant was

found guilty of criminal contempt and therefore was entitled to
all of the procedural and substantive protections that criminal
defendants are afforded.

The failure to treat this matter as

criminal constitutes clear reversible error.
2.

Because a finding of civil contempt can result in

unlimited jail incarceration an accused defendant is entitled to
assistance of counsel if he is indigent and unable to afford
counsel.

No such inquiry was made in the instant case thereby

violating Defendant's due process rights.
3.

Before criminal contempt can be imposed upon a defendant

the moving party must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a
petitioner had the ability to comply with the court's order and
has willfully failed to do so.

In this case, no evidentiary

hearing was held at all in May and therefore this burden was
never even attempted to be met.

For this reason there is no

evidence in the record to justify Defendant's conviction for
criminal contempt.
4.

Likewise, before being able to be convicted of civil

contempt the moving party must show by clear and convincing
evidence that a defendant has the present ability to purge
himself by making the necessary required child support payments.
Again, no evidentiary hearing at all was held in this matter and
there is no evidentiary basis to believe that Defendant was able
to meet the conditions of the court to be released from
incarceration.
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5.

Before a court can impose criminal or civil contempt it

must make findings of fact and conclusions of law which are
legally sufficient.

In the instant case no such findings were

ever made as to the May hearing which resulted in Defendant's
imprisonment.

For this reason, therefore, the incarceration was

contrary to law.
6.

Article 1 Section 16 of the Utah Constitution prohibits

imprisonment for debt.

Since there was no showing in this case

that the defendant was willfully refusing to pay his support
obligations, his imprisonment clearly violated this section of
the Utah Constitution.
7.

Utah divorce statutes allow courts to assess attorneys*

fees in order to enable a party to prosecute or defend the
divorce action.

This statute does not authorize costs incurred

in ancillary lawsuits not directly related to the divorce itself
nor does it permit the District Court to assess attorneys' fees
when such fees have not been granted by the higher courts.
ARGUMENT
Courts, lawyers, and clients are all familiar with the term
"contempt of court." It is a concept which is utilized each day
in our judicial system as a threat or as an actual punishment.
It is therefore surprising that the technicalities of contempt
are so little known by those who daily utilize it.

Hopefully,

the instant case and another case involving criminal contempt of
a lawyer being decided by a panel of this Court (State v.
Long, No. 910708) will help to educate the judges and lawyers of
this State to better understand the requirements of this drastic
remedy.

Defendant will first examine the legal technicalities of
criminal and civil contempt to demonstrate that this case
involves both.

Next, he will argue that his state and federal

constitutional rights were clearly violated in the procedural
aspects of both the criminal and civil contempt citations.
Defendant will then review the evidentiary basis that is
required before criminal and civil contempt can be imposed and
will demonstrate that this case has no such basis.

Furthermore,

the lower court failed to make the required findings in order to
justify any imposition of criminal and civil contempt.

Defendant

will next urge that without evidence of a willful failure to pay
a support obligation imprisonment amounts to a Utah State
constitutional violation of imprisonment for pure debt.
Finally, Defendant will attack the award of attorneys* fees
to Plaintiff concerning an extraordinary writ action brought
before the Utah Supreme Court and an habeas corpus action brought
before the Federal District Court.

Defendant will demonstrate

that such fees are not allowable under Utah statute and cannot be
made by the District Court unless specifically ordered by the
other ancillary courts.

These items will not be addressed in

serium.
POINT I
THE JANUARY AND MAY ORDERS OF THE LOWER
COURT CONSTITUTE BOTH CRIMINAL, AND CIVIL
CONTEMPT.
During the September 23, 1992 hearing Judge Wilkinson made
the following enlightening statement:
And when you talk about criminal contempt, this
Court was not indicating in any way that it was a
criminal proceeding here. This has been a civil action,
and of course the contempt was a civil contempt under
-9£-

the law.

(R. 696) .

This statement says it all.

The lower court simply did not

understand that even in this clearly civil action he had imposed
a criminal sentence against a defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d
1162 (Utah 1988) discussed in detail the law of contempt of
court.

The Court stated:

The primary determinant of whether a particular
contempt order is to be labeled civil or criminal is the
trial court's purpose in entering the order....A
contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to
vindicate the court's authority, as by punishing an
individual for disobeying an order, even if the order
arises from civil proceedings....A contempt order is
civil if it has a remedial purpose, either to coerce an
individual to comply with a court order given for the
benefit of another party, or to compensate an aggrieved
party for injuries resulting from the failure to comply
with an order. Id. at 1168.
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the United States
Supreme Court decision of Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S.

624

(1988) in which the distinction between criminal and civil
contempt was outlined in terms of federal constitutional law. The
Utah Supreme Court stated that it would adopt the Feiock
approach as a matter of state law in the following manner:
For all future cases, we will follow the rule that
a contempt order is criminal if the fine or sentence
imposed is fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the
fine or imprisonment is conditional such that the
contemner can obtain relief from the contempt order
merely by doing some act as ordered by the court.
Further, a contempt order is civil if the order is to
pay a fine to the other party rather than to the court.
759 P.2d 1168 at n.5.
The Order of Contempt being appealed in this case eminated
originally from the January 7, 1992 hearing.

As quoted earlier,

the Court relied upon Section 78-32-10 to fine Defendant $200 and
to sentence him to thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail.
-27-

(Tr. at 10, January 7, 1992 hearing).

In addition, relying upon

Section 78-32-12 the Court stated, "that after serving the thirty
days, he is to continue to serve time in jail until he pays the
child support as ordered by the Court." Id. at 11. The written
order and findings echoes this same scheme of contempt.
549-53; 555-63).

(R.

Likewise, the May 18, 1992 hearing incorporated

this prior contempt sentence and reapplied it once again.

(Tr.

May 18, 1992 at 2-4). The written order also repeated the
criminal and civil contempt penalties.

(R.

613-14).

It is obvious, therefore, that the Court first sentenced
Defendant to a criminal contempt charge of thirty days in the
county jail plus a fine of $200.

Second, the Court imposed a

civil contempt penalty for unlimited additional jail time beyond
the thirty days until Defendant purged himself by paying the
delinquent amount.

In both cases, however, the Court stayed

these sentences to give the defendant ten days in which to pay
the set amount required.

Pursuant to the January order Defendant

was able to borrow $5,000 and thus avoid incarceration.

As to

the second order in May, however, Defendant was unable to ever
make this payment and it was only through the money of his father
that Defendant was released from incarceration.

Had his father

not paid this required amount, there is no doubt in appellate
counsel's mind that Defendant would still be incarcerated!
The lower court together with many other judges and lawyers
practicing in Utah erroneously believe that if a thirty-day jail
sentence is stayed for a definite period of time to allow payment
of a specified amount that the contempt is civil and not criminal
since the defendant has the opportunity to "purge" himself before
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going to jail.

However, this reasoning is erroneous since the

ability to purge must be present while incarcerated. Two cases
from other jurisdictions which utilize the identical orders of
this case were clearly found to constitute criminal contempt.
Maddux v. Maddux, 475 N.W.2d 524 (Neb.

1991) the lower court

gave the defendant a short period of time to come up with an
amount in arrears.

If he did not do so, like here, he was

ordered to spend thirty days in the county jail.

The Nebraska

Supreme Court stated:
The order ceased to be coercive on April 1, 1989
because the jail sentence was no longer subject to
mitigation. If the child support amounts due were not
paid by April 1, 1989, Maddux was required to serve a
punitive thirty-day sentence, regardless of whether the
amounts were paid subsequent to that date. Maddux no
longer would be "holding the keys to his jail cell"
after April 1. An unconditional penalty is criminal in
nature because it is "solely and exclusively punitive in
character." Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633
(1988). Id. at 528.
Likewise, in the case of In Re Marriage of Talmadge, 534
N.E.2d 1356 (Ill.App. 1989) a similar order was entered by the
lower court.

The Illinois Court of Appeals stated:

In the instant case, the order finding respondent
in contempt sentenced him to thirty days in jail with
said sentence to be stayed for a period of 45 days to
allow respondent to purge himself by payment of
$4,806.22 to petitioner. We find that this order was
criminal in nature because, once respondent failed to
pay within 45 days, he was to be incarcerated without
any way to purge himself. See Hicks, 108 S.Ct. at
1432. Thus, assuming that on remand, the trial court
finds that petitioner did consult with respondent,
respondent should be entitled to a new hearing using the
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1363.
The second phase of Judge Wilkinson's contempt order was
clearly civil in nature.

Civil contempt proceedings have two

fundamental attributes: (1) the contemner must be capable of
taking the action sought to be coerced and (2) no further
-2Q-

contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemner's compliance
with the pertinent court order.

In other words, the contemner

must have an opportunity to purge himself of contempt by
complying with the pertinent court order.

If the contempt

sanction is incarceration, the defendant's circumstances should
be such that he may correctly be viewed as possessing the "keys
to his cell." Penfield Co.
Von Hake, supra, p.

v. S.E.C, 330 U.S.

585, 590 (1947);

1168.

Under the civil contempt rule, a party can be held
indefinitely in jail until such time as he complies with the
court order.

Thus, a civil contempt citation may carry a much

greater penalty than a criminal citation.

An important standard

that must be considered in civil contempt cases, however, is that
the person who is sentenced to prison or jail must be capable of
purging himself at any time.

As noted by the United States

Supreme Court in Feiock, supra:
Our precedents are clear, however, that punishment
may not be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding when
it is clearly established that the alleged contemner is
unable to comply with the terms of the order. 485 U.S.
at 638.
See also, State Ex Rel N.A.

v. G.S., 456 N.W.2d 867

(Wis.App. 1990) (compliance with the purge provision must be
within the power of the contemner); Maddux v. Maddux, 475
N.W.2d 524 (Neb. 1991) (to be reasonable, the amount of money
required to be paid for a contemner to purge himself or herself
of contempt of court must be within the contemner's ability to
pay) .
The Supreme Court of Michigan and the Supreme Court of
Florida have held that even though a contempt order is in the

-30-

nature of civil contempt, it immediately becomes criminal in
nature if the defendant is unable to comply with its terms.
Sword v. Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88 (Mich.

In

1976), the court

stated:
If the defendant does not have the present ability
to pay, then he does not have the "keys to the jail";
what is nominally a civil contempt proceeding is in fact
a criminal proceeding—the defendant is not being
coerced, but punished. Id. at 88.
See also. Mead v. Batchelor, 460 N.W.2d 493 (Mich.

1990);

Bowen v. Bowen, 471 S.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985).
A final legal principle that should be noted in the criminal
versus civil contempt comparison is that if both civil and
criminal relief are imposed in the same proceeding, then the
"criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its
character for purposes of review." Nye v. United States, 313 U.S.
33, 42-43 (1941); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d at 1169.
In addition to labeling a contempt of court either criminal
or civil in nature, it is necessary to determine whether the
contempt is direct, i.e., committed in the presence of the judge,
or indirect, i.e., committed outside the presence of the judge.
Section 78-32-3, U.C.A.; Von Hake v. Thomas, supra at 1169.
also, In Re Marriage of Betz, 558 N.E.2d 404, 418 (Ill.App.
1990) where the court stated:
Simply put, indirect contempt includes all
contempts which do not occur in such proximity to a
court that they fall within the direct contempt
category. In indirect contempt cases, the judge does
not have full personal knowledge of all elements of the
contempt. Therefore, proof of facts of which the court
cannot take judicial notice must be presented in order
to support a finding of contempt. Id. at 418-19.
In the instant case, there can be no doubt but that
defendant was found guilty of indirect criminal and civil

See

contempt.

His failure to make the support payments clearly

occurred outside of the presence of the court and required proof
from Plaintiff in order for a contempt finding to be made.

The

thirty-day incarceration and fine was clearly criminal in nature
for failure to pay past obligations.

The additional

incarceration until he paid the future required amounts was
clearly civil in nature.
Obviously, it is to a defendant's advantage to contend that
a contempt of court is criminal because of the much higher burden
which attaches to a criminal contempt proceeding.

Conversely, it

is to the opposing party's advantage to claim the contempt is
civil.

In the instant case, Defendant argued before the Utah

Supreme Court and the Federal District Court that the thirty-day
provision was criminal and therefore he had been denied all of
his federal and state due process rights.

To counter this

argument, Plaintiff prepared the bench warrants in such a manner
that they were ambiguous.

As noted earlier, in each case the

three bench warrants provided that Defendant would be confined
for a period of thirty days "or until such time as he shall purge
himself." Plaintiff argued below, therefore, that based upon the
language of the bench warrant (not upon the underlying order)
that this was a civil contempt order with a cap of thirty days
and the option of early release if he were to pay the money
sooner.

See e.g., October 9, 1992 hearing, at 13-14.

This

accidental or intentional ambiguity in the bench warrants created
the strange situation where Defendant's counsel had to ask the
lower court to modify the bench warrant for purpose of future
argument in the federal court even though it would mean a

straight thirty-day incarceration for the defendant without any
opportunity to be released sooner.
693-96).

(Tr. September 23, 1992, R.

The court refused to modify the bench warrants, finding

no ambiguity in their wording,

(R. 696).

Based upon the interpretation of the bench warrants by
Plaintiff during the due process hearing before the Utah Supreme
Court and the Federal District Court, Defendant could only serve
a maximum of thirty days imprisonment and could be released
sooner if he produced the necessary money.

However, when it

suddenly appeared that Defendant was indeed going to serve the
entire thirty-day sentence and be released, the Plaintiff
panicked and immediately ran to the District Court seeking help.
Plaintiff now argued to the lower court in the ex parte hearing
that Defendant had to serve beyond the thirty days until such
time as he came up with the money.

See "Motion for Order

Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment," and
"Affidavit of Sharon A.
of Vol.

Donovan" contained in unnumbered portion

II of District Court Record.

The Court dutifully

entered an "Ex Parte Order Extending Revised Warrant and Order of
Commitment" on the eve that Defendant was supposed to be released
from the Salt Lake County jail after serving the thirty-day
sentence.
Thus, Plaintiff had the best of both worlds.

She was able

to argue to the Utah Supreme Court and through the County
Attorney in the Federal District Court that this was merely a
civil order of contempt with a thirty-day cap and therefore, the
arguments of Defendant as to criminal due process simply did not
apply.

When it appeared that Defendant would be released from

jail after serving the thirty-day sentence, the plaintiff
immediately ran to the District Court Judge who readily changed
the bench warrant to require Defendant's incarceration
indefinitely.

The "thirty-day cap" under the Court's revised

bench warrant of October 22 therefore had no meaning whatsoever
except to illustrate that it was indeed a thirty-day criminal
sentence.
This Court should not condone the action of Plaintiff and
the trial court in manipulating the underlying court order in
such a way as to make it extremely difficult for Defendant to
assert his constitutional rights in the appellate and federal
judicial system.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS DURING THE PROCEEDINGS OF
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.
For purposes of this section, only the thirty-day sentence
and fine will be examined.

However, as noted earlier, if

Defendant is unable to meet the financial obligation imposed by
the court then the entire contempt proceeding is also criminal in
nature.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the standard to be applied
as to indirect criminal contempt proceedings.

That Court

stated:
The due process provisions of the Federal
Constitution requires that in a prosecution for a
contempt not committed in the presence of the court,
"the person charged be advised of the nature of the
action against him—or her—have assistance of counsel,
if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and
have the right to offer testimony on his [or her]
behalf....These protections are amplified upon in the
Code, which requires, interalia, that in a case of
indirect contempt, an affidavit must be presented to the
-74-

court reciting the facts constituting the contempt in
order to insure that the court and the person charged
are informed of the conduct alleged to be contemptuous.
Von Hake, supra, at 1150 (citations omitted).
See also, Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).
Clearly, charges of indirect criminal contempt deserve the
same constitutional protections as any other crime.

Several

courts throughout the country have enumerated these rights.
Vito v. Vito, 551 A.2d 573 (Pa.Super.

In

1988), the court noted

that where one is accused of indirect criminal contempt he shall
enjoy the normal rights to bail, rights to be notified of the
accusation and time to prepare a defense, and the right to a
speedy and public trial by impartial jury.

In addition, he is

entitled to the assistance of counsel and may only be found
guilty if every element of the crime is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

"In short, the accused in such a proceeding is

entitled to the essential procedural safeguards that attend
criminal proceedings generally." Id. at 575-76.
In re Marriage of Betts, 558 N.E.2d 404, 425 (111.App.
1990).

The Illinois Appellate Court observed a common problem

which occurs in these type of divorce proceedings.

As in the

instant case, the party who is being charged with contempt is
served notice that he is to "show cause" why he should not be
held in contempt.

By definition, however, if a defendant accused

of criminal contempt has a constitutional right not to testify,
he cannot be required to "show cause" since this violates his
right to remain silent.

In addition, in a criminal contempt the

burden is on the petitioner to prove the charges in the petition
beyond a reasonable doubt and not upon the defendant to prove his
innocence.

558 N.E.2d at 425.

The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake, supra, recognized that
in criminal contempt proceedings, it must be shown that the
person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability
to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. These
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

759 P.2d at

1172.
A review of the record now before this Court shows without
question that the federal and state due process rights of
Defendant were never applied in the instant case.

Petitioner was

incarcerated for nearly thirty days because of the May 18
proceeding.

From the record now before this Court it is apparent

that he was never advised of the criminal nature of the
proceeding, never advised of his right to counsel or the right to
have counsel appointed by the court if he was indigent, never
advised of his right to remain silent, and never advised of his
right to cross examine witnesses or to confront his accusers.
While Defendant does not believe the January hearing is
relevant to this issue of contempt, this same deficiency is
equally applicable to that hearing.
For the above reasons, therefore, Defendant was illegally
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail in direct violation of
federal and state constitutional procedural mandates.

His

conviction must be reversed.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS TO CIVIL CONTEMPT BY
FAILING TO INQUIRE IF DEFENDANT WAS INDIGENT
AND WHETHER COUNSEL NEEDED TO BE APPOINTED.
Incarceration under civil contempt can have a far greater
consequence than that for criminal contempt.

Utah law, for

example, places a ceiling of thirty days incarceration for
criminal contempt, but places no such ceiling for civil contempt.
Compare Section 78-32-10, U.C.A. with Section 78-32-12, U.C.A.
The California Court of Appeals stated this problem as follows:
More importantly, because the consequences of a
"civil" contempt are potentially greater than those of a
"criminal" one, the procedural protection in those cases
should be the same or stronger. Child support cases
provide a perfect example. In each type of proceeding,
ability to pay can be an issue. But a criminal contempt
conviction results in no more than a five-day jail
sentence and a $1,000 fine for each contempt, while a
civil contemner may be imprisoned indefinitely pending
compliance. Thus, the consequences of a mistake on the
ability to pay issue are infinitely graver in a civil
than in a criminal contempt. Pity the poor civil
contemner who rots in jail, having erroneously been
determined to hold the keys to release!
The preferable rule in contempt proceedings might
be that the more stringent due process protections apply
whenever the contemner is faced with the potential for
any jail time. In Re Feiock, 263 Cal.Rptr. 437,
440-41, n.6 (Cal.App. 1989).
While the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have never
addressed the issue of appointment of counsel in civil contempt
proceedings to indigent defendants, it is submitted that both
federal and state due process of law requires such appointment be
made or, at the minimum, inquiry of indigency status be made.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that indigent
defendants have a right to have counsel appointed at government
expense when their physical liberty is in jeopardy.
Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S.

18, 26-27 (1981).

Lassiter v.
Numerous

federal circuit courts have held that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment require that an indigent defendant in a
non-support proceeding may not be incarcerated if he has been
denied the assistance of counsel.
(6th Cir.

Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262

1984); Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir.

1985); Ridgeway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir.
and Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.

1983);
1973).

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Walker v. McLain,
768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985) found that the right to counsel as
an aspect of due process turns not on whether the proceeding may
be characterized as criminal or civil, but on whether the
proceedings may result in deprivation of liberty.

The Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals, in quoting a decision from the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, stated the following:
It is the defendant's interest in personal freedom,
and not simply the special "Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel" in criminal cases, which
triggers the right to appointed counsel. It would be
absurd to distinguish criminal and civil incarceration;
from the prospective of the person incarcerated, the
jail is just as bleak no matter which label is used. In
addition, the line between criminal and civil contempt
is a fine one, and is rarely as clear as the state would
have us believe. The right to counsel, as an aspect of
due process, turns not on whether a proceeding may be
characterized as "criminal" or "civil" but on whether
the proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty.
Id. at 1183.
The Tenth Circuit of Appeals knows the need for counsel is
even greater in civil contempt cases.

The Court stated:

If petitioner is truly indigent, his liberty
interest is no more conditional than if he were serving
a criminal sentence; he does not have the keys to the
prison doors if he cannot afford the price. The fact
that he should not have been jailed if he is truly
indigent only highlights the need for counsel, for the
assistance of a lawyer would have greatly aided him in
establishing his indigency and insuring that he was not
improperly incarcerated. The argument that the
petitioner has the keys to the jailhouse door does not
apply to diminish petitioner's liberty interest. Id. at
1184.
In addition, a number of federal district courts have
reached a similar result.
801 (D.Mich.

McKenstry v. Genesee Co., 669 F.Supp.

1987); Johnson v. Zurz, 596 F.Supp.
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39 (D.Ohio

1984); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F.Supp.
v, Whitworth, 522 F.Supp.
Fellerhoff, 526 F.Supp.

1318 (D.Conn.

1984); Young

759 (D.Ohio 1981); Maston v.
969 (D.Ohio 1981).

Likewise, a large majority of the state courts have held
that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel in a civil
contempt proceeding before he can be incarcerated.
Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451 (N.D.
N.W.2d 493 (Mich.
<N.Y.

State v.

1991); Mead v. Batchelor, 460

1990); New York v. Lobenthal, 516 N.Y.S.2d 928

1987); In Re: Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117

(Ind.App.

1987); Hunt v. Moreland, 697 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.App.

1985); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md.
v. Lopes, 481 A.2d 1293 (Conn.
645 P.2d 1327 (Colo.App.

1983); Dube

1984); and Padilla v. Padilla,

1982).

During both the January and May proceedings Defendant
represented himself.

Defendant's wife testified in the January

proceeding that they were unable to afford an attorney.

In an

affidavit filed with this Court in support of a stay, Defendant
stated he was financially unable to afford counsel to represent
him.

Defendant's income tax returns for 1989, 1990 and 1991

fully support his position of income.

Plaintiff has not shown in

any of these proceedings below sources of income or assets which
have been hidden or which are available to Defendant upon
command.

Instead, Plaintiff has relied upon the wealth of

Defendant's father as the source of income from which these
delinquent amounts can be paid.

Such reliance is clearly

inappropriate, improper, and illegal since Defendant's father is
under no legal obligation to support his son or his son's
ex-spouse and children.
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It is submitted that under the standards enunciated by these
numerous courts throughout the country, Defendant was and is
entitled to appointed counsel in these civil contempt proceedings
in which he faces unlimited jail incarceration for failure to
make support payments.

The failure to make any inquiry as to his

financial status not only goes to the issue of the substantive
evidence required for contempt but also goes to the question of
appointment of counsel.

As such, the failure to make this

inquiry voids any finding of civil contempt.
POINT IV
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND, IN
ADDITION, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO
IMPOSE CONTEMPT.
The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake, supra, found that the
trial court must enter written findings of fact and conclusions
of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements of
contempt.

759 P.2d at 1172.

These include a showing that the

defendant knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and
intentionally failed or refused to do so.

These elements must be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt
proceeding and by clear and convincing evidence in a civil
contempt proceeding.

Id.

This Court in State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Utah App.
1991) held that written findings of fact and conclusions of law
are not required because of an amendment to the civil code
provided that these findings are contained'somewhere in the
written record.

Even if this interpretation of the Von Hake

decision is correct, the record clearly shows that no such
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findings exist in any form.
The present contempt of court action in which defendant was
incarcerated for nearly thirty days was based upon the May
hearing in which no separate findings of fact or conclusions of
law were made.

While the order of June 19, 1992 recites that the

Court "made and entered adequate and sufficient findings of fact"
no such findings or conclusions exist.

Moreover, there is no

evidence in the May hearing justifying the conclusion of criminal
or civil contempt.

No evidence was formally taken at all!

The

only statements made by Plaintiff's attorney relating to
Defendant's ability to pay concern the sale of his father's farm
and the inadequacy of Defendant's income.

Neither of these

unsupported assertions are sufficient to incarcerate a defendant
father.
There is a major distinction between an original divorce
action and a supplemental action for contempt.

As in this case,

the lower court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant was capable of making the support payments in spite of
his claims to the contrary.

This Court affirmed that decision

based upon the lower court's discretion.

The result of these

decisions was to impose a continuing financial obligation upon
the defendant to meet the amounts awarded to the plaintiff.
Failure to comply with the court's order results in a monetary
judgment being levied against the defendant and subjects his
income and property to continued attachment by plaintiff as a
creditor.
On the other hand, this same standard of evidence is not
appropriate in contempt proceedings.

-ZL1 -

In order for civil contempt

to apply there must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence
of the present ability of the defendant to meet the obligations
ordered by the court.

In criminal proceedings this proof rises

to the highest level of beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, under

either of these standards mere speculation as to what the
defendant should be making as a veterinarian or inferences that
his family should be able to assist him in his support obligation
are simply insufficient as a matter of law.
The evidentiary hearing held in January is equally defective
should it be relevant to this case.

Defendant would assert,

however, that as a matter of law this hearing is not relevant
ince Defendant's incarceration did not directly eminate from that
hearing.

Moreover, as a matter of principle a hearing which is

held five months prior to another hearing in which contempt is
ordered is simply insufficient to meet the high standards of
proof since the financial ability of a defendant can change from
month to month and it is simply against due process of law to
allow previous hearings as the evidentiary basis for subsequent
contempts.
In any event, there is nothing contained in the January
findings to indicate the willful failure to have paid past
obligations or the present ability of the defendant to pay these
large arrearages and ongoing obligations.

No finding whatsoever

is made of his income, with the exception of paragraph 5(f) which
states: "Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of 15
years and testified he earns $5 per hour in connection with
consultations he claims he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal
Hospital.

Defendant had and has the means to pay child support."

This conclusionary statement is inadequate as a basis to
show Defendant's ability to pay these amounts by clear and
convincing evidence or to show that he willfully failed to pay
his past obligations beyond a reasonable doubt.

No contrary

evidence was offered by Plaintiff as to what the defendant should
have been making as a veterinarian or that he was guilty of
federal fraud for falsely reporting his income on the federal tax
forms.

There is not a single reference contained in the findings

of January to show that Defendant has the past or present ability
to pay the amounts now imposed by the lower court.
The Utah Supreme Court has required that civil contempt
cannot be imposed without an affirmative finding by the lower
court of a present ability to comply.
627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981).

Bradshaw v. Kershaw,

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court

in Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983) held that a
lower court must make explicit findings as to a defendant's
ability to comply when there is conflicting evidence.

Failure to

provide sufficient findings of the ability to comply with a
contempt order requires automatic reversal.
supra, 1159 P.2d at 1173.

Von Hake,

See also, Matter of Elder,

763 P.2d 219 (Ala. 1988).
In summary, the fact that this Court affirmed the award of
child support and alimony in the previous appeal is completely
irrelevant to the issues now before this Court as to the
contempt.

An examinaton of the transcripts of the May and

January hearings show that there is clearly insufficient evidence
to justify a finding of criminal contempt or civil contempt.
Moreover, the lower court has completely failed in its obligation
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to make explicit findings needed in order to affirm these types
of contempt proceedings.

It is submitted that lower courts

routinely abuse the penalty of contempt and subject litigants to
illegal hardship caused by the courts1 failures to understand and
to follow the concepts of criminal and civil contempt.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S INCARCERATION FOR THIRTY
DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT
THERE SHALL BE NO IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.
Each day hundreds of judgments are entered in the State of
Utah.

In each case one party is indebted to another.

It is rare

indeed, however, that such indebtedness results in jail
incarceration.

Defendant, in fact, knows of no classification of

cases except for domestic relation controversies in which
indebtedness can result in jail sentences.
Obviously, the reason that child support and other marital
obligations can result in imprisonment whereas other forms of
debts do not, is the value society places upon the support of its
children.

If a father willfully refuses to meet his support

obligation then society allows the father's imprisonment until he
meets his moral and legal obligation.

On the other hand, if a

father is simply unable to meet his financial obligation through
no willful disobedience then imprisonment is no more justified
than in any other case involving debt.
The Utah Supreme Court in Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d
1119 (Utah 1977) discussed Article I Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution.

The Court stated:

Under what we regard as a view more enlightened
than prevailed in former times, the mere failure to pay

a debt or meet an obligation is not punishable by
imprisonment. (Citing Article I Section 16, Utah
Constitution). However, when a proper order or judgment
has been made, one who stands in willful defiance or
disobedience thereof may be found in contempt of court
and punished by imprisonment....Although technically
civil in nature, the finding of a person in contempt and
sentencing him to jail is a very serious consequence to
the person involved, somewhat akin to a criminal
penalty. It is for this reason that such a severe
measure is not permissible unless a party has manifested
such obstinacy in disobedience of the court order that
it is necessary to accomplish that which equity and
justice demand. Accordingly, in order to justify a
finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail
sentence, it must appear by clear and convincing proof
that (1) the party knew what was required of him; (2)
that he had the ability to comply; and (3) that he
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
Id. at 1121. (Emphasis added).
This Court can search the record in vain for any evidence to
show that defendant Jerry Osguthorpe willfully refused to meet
the obligations imposed by the court during the divorce
proceeding.

Plaintiff has been unable to point to any source of

income that Defendant is shielding or hiding.

There is no asset

which Defendant could utilize in satisfying the court obligation.
In fact, the income that Defendant now has is nearly identical to
that which he had during the marriage to Plaintiff.

An

examination of all of the income tax forms from 1981 to 1991
reveal almost a consistent pattern of income.
Plaintiff has convinced Judge Wilkinson to the contrary by
relying upon three arguments: (1) Defendant should be making more
as a veterinarian; (2) Defendant lives very nicely with his
present wife and therefore must have money; (3) Defendant's
family and father are very wealthy and therefore he must have
money too.
These emotional arguments of Plaintiff in her claim of a
"deadbeat dad" are not legally or factually supportable.

Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence in the record to
show what the defendant should be making as a veterinarian.

Not

one item of evidence exists as to the normal income of a contract
veterinarian such as defendant.

Essentially, the lower court is

taking judicial notice of what he believes the defendant should
be making and holding him to that standard.
The income or assets of Defendant's wife is equally
irrelevant.

The fact that Defendant has married a woman who was

given a house and other assets from her ex-husband is irrelevant
to the obligation of Defendant.

She is not required to utilize

her assets in paying his pre-marital debts.

Furthermore, the

fact that Defendant contributes $500 to the household expenses
each month is not justification for imprisonment.

Had he not

married his current wife it is unlikely that even Judge Wilkinson
would have denied him the use of $500 for his own living
expenses.
Finally, the fact that his father and family are purportedly
wealthy is also irrelevant to placing Defendant in jail.
Defendant's family is not legally obligated to support
Defendant's children.

The dialogue which occurred between

Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's father is indicative of
Plaintiffs feeling that D.A.

Osguthorpe is obligated to pay his

son's financial obligations.
The cold hard record in this case shows without question
that defendant Jerry Osguthorpe is financially incapable of
meeting the demands of the court and will consistently be
indebted to the plaintiff as long as support must continue.
However, such indebtedness does not show contempt and does not

justify imprisonment.

Innuendoes and implications cannot be used

as the clear and convincing evidence or the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that must be present before incarceration can
occur.
The past incarceration in the Salt Lake County jail and the
future threat of incarceration are not permissible under the Utah
Constitution based upon the record as it now exists.

Defendant's

imprisonment was clearly unconstitutional and any future attempt
for imprisonment without a strong showing of additional evidence
by plaintiff cannot be tolerated.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS
A RESULT OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION AND THE
FEDERAL COURT HABEAS CORPUS ACTION.
There is no question but that Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. provides
that either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the
adverse party to prosecute or defend the action.
Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App.

1989).

Maughn v.

In addition, there is no

question but that this Court in its discretion may award
attorney's fees on appeal especially if they were awarded by the
lower court in the divorce action.
408 (Utah App.

Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d

1989).

The decision to award attorneys' fees on appeal, however,
rests with the appellate court.

In this very action, for

example, this Court originally awarded only attorneys' fees as to
the divorce proceeding in the lower court.

Plaintiff petitioned

for rehearing and this Court subsequently issued a separate
opinion in which attorneys' fees on appeal were ordered.
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Obviously, Plaintiff was aware that in the absence of such an
award by this Court she could not seek attorneys1 fees on appeal
from Judge Wilkinson.

She correctly petitioned this Court for an

order remanding to the lower court for a determination of fees.
Likewise, in the motion to stay the contempt proceeding
Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees for her effort.

This court in

denying the stay granted attorneys' fees on appeal and once again
remanded for a determination of the amount.

Thus, the instant

case itself is a prime example of the principle that a superior
court must itself award attorneys' fees in an appeal before an
inferior court can determine their amount.
Section 30-3-3 is unique.

In most instances involving

litigation, attorney fees are not awarded to the opposing party.
As such, this section must be strictly construed.

The section

states that the court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money "to enable such party to prosecute or defend the
action." The term "the action" must refer to a divorce proceeding
since it is contained in Chapter 3 of the Utah Code exclusively
dealing with divorce.
Defendant sought a writ of mandamus and/or common law writ
of certiorari from the Utah Supreme Court to require this Court
or Judge Wilkinson to grant a stay of imprisonment until this
matter had been decided on appeal.

Thus, the action before the

Supreme Court was not one of divorce but was one seeking to stay
Defendant's imprisonment on the theory of judicial abuse of
discretion.

As such, therefore, Section 30-3-3 cannot be used to

grant authority for attorneys' fees to plaintiff before the Utah
Supreme Court.
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The action in the Federal District Court is even more
apparent.

There, Defendant brought an action against the Salt

Lake County Sheriff seeking relief based on the writ of habeas
corpus.

Plaintiff was not even a named party in that lawsuit.

Certainly Section 30-3-3 cannot be utilized to pay the costs of a
non-party in a federal habeas corpus action.
Moreover, in the Supreme Court action Plaintiff specifically
asked the court to grant attorneys* fees to her in her effort to
incarcerate her former husband.

The court made no such award.

Had it wished to award attorney fees it could have honored her
request since Plaintiff's attorney specifically proffered an
amount of fees and costs during oral argument.
Neither this Court nor the trial court has authority even in
a divorce action to award attorney fees incurred in a higher
court without that court's discretionary approval.

Judge

Wilkinson was in error in believing that he could make such an
award in the complete absence of authority by the Supreme Court
ordering such an award be made.
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court's award of
attorneys' fees to Plaintiff as to the Supreme Court action and
the Federal habeas corpus action must be vacated and these
amounts must be subtracted from the judgment entered against
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of contempt and
for attorney fees must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 1992.
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 874904967
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
Defendant,
-oOoPlaintifffs Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and
Other -Related Matters came on regularly for hearing on October 9,
1992, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, one of the Judges of
the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in person and by and
through her attorney, Sharon A- Donovan, and Defendant appearing in
person and being represented by his attorney, Craig S. Cook, and
Plaintiff having been called as a witness on her Motion, and the
Court having heard the testimony and reviewed the pleadings and
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Judgment shall enter against Defendant in the sum of

$1,625.00, which represents $1,100,00 unpaid child support through

the first half of October, 1992, and $525.00 alimony through the
first half of October, 1992.
2.
Utah

The Court finds that Defendant has filed an appeal in the

Court

of

Appeals

from

the

District

Court's

finding

of

contempt, has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Utah
Supreme Court and further filed a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus
against

the

Sherifffs

Department,

necessitating

action

and

attorney's fees on behalf of the Plaintiff.
The Court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , §30-3-3, this
Court has the authority in divorce actions to grant fees as may be
appropriate in this matter.
judgment

of

$5,214.25

Based thereon, the Court orders a

against

Defendant

for

attorney's

fees

Plaintiff has reasonably incurred in defending the matters filed by
Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and Federal Court.
The Court further finds that the Court of Appeals specifically
remanded to the trial Court the award of Appellee's costs and
attorney's fees reasonably incurred in opposing the stay.

The

Court further finds that the judgment for attorney's fees in the
Supreme Court of $3,196.60 and the Federal Court of $620.70 shall
be awarded by way of judgment, unless the Federal Court or Supreme
Court specifically

indicate that it was their intention not to

award attorney's fees to Plaintiff in this matter.

The relief

requested by Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Federal Court and
Supreme Court have all been denied by those Courts.

2

The Court

further finds that Defendant shall receive credit for time served
from the previous jail sentence in this matter.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have the
ability to pay these fees and that these fees are reasonable, in
light of the actions of Defendant, and that Defendant has the
ability to pay said fees.

The Court further finds that these fees

are segregated as follows:
Court of Appeals
Supreme Court
Federal Court

$1,396.95
3,196.60
620.70

Total:

$5,214.25

The Court further finds that judgment shall enter against
Defendant in the sum of $300.00 for additional fees, for purposes
of

this

hearing,

for

a

total

judgment

for

this

$7,139.25.
DATED this

day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

CRAIG S. COOK
Attorney for Defendant
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hearing

of

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
MARTIN VERHOEF #3326
Deputy Salt lake County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
2001 South State Street, IS3600
Salt lake City, Utah 84190-1200
(801) 468-2656

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,

Order of Dismissal

Petitioner
*

-v-

Case No. 92C-0748A

Aaron D. Kennard# Sheriff
of Salt lake County,
Respondent

The referrenced matter came on for hearing on Friday, October
2, 1992, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins presiding, Craig Cook
appearing

for

Petitioner

and

Marty

Verhoef

appearing

for

Respondent;
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file and having
heard arguments of counsel concerning Petitioner's opportunity and
ability to be heard on the merits in the Courts of the State of
Utah,

including appellate review on the merits, Petitioner's

present opportunity for further review within the State Courts upon
allegations

of

changed

circumstances

which

would

justify

modifications of current support orders, and the Federal Court's
extreme deference to the factual findings of the Courts of the
f

w

State of Utah and the right of a State Trial Court to vindicate its
own orders; and
It appearing to the Court Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that Petitioner's custody was in violation of the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States;
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED the entitled matter be
and hereby is dismissed.
Dated this

lis

. day of

D ^^VJLM^V

By the Court:

Bruce 5. Jen
District
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
MARTIN VERHOEF #3326
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
2001 South State Street, #S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
(801) 468-2656

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,

*

Petitioner

*

-v-

*

Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff
of Salt Lake County,

*

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 92C-0748A

Respondent
Respondent, through counsel of record hereby answers the
allegations of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Petitioner was released from incarceration on August 31, 1992
upon

payment

of

$2,000 pursuant

to

Court

order

filed

with

Respondent. A copy of said order, a receipt for the funds, booking
record and jail internal log sheet are attached hereto as exhibits.
Petitioner's lack of custody deprives the Court of jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §2254 requiring dismissal.
SECOND DEFENSE
Petitioner is not in custody and therefore is seeking relief
against a future judgment.

Petitioner has not rcjquested such

t

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 92C-0748A
Page 2

relief nor named the Attorney General of the State of Utah as
respondent.

The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is not a proper party

to such an action.
THIRD DEFENSE
Petitioner's incarceration was for civil contempt as reflected
by the Court order attached hereto as an exhibit.

Said order

committed Petitioner into the custody of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff "for a period of thirty (30) days, or until such time as he
shall purge himself..." of contempt by paying past due alimony,
child support and attorney's fees totalling $2,000 to plaintiff,
Jeanette C. Osguthorpe.

Civil contempt custody is not a proper

ground upon which relief may be granted.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Responding to the allegations of the petition, Respondent
answers as follows:
1•

Admitted•

2.

Denied.

The judgment received by Respondent from the

trial court was dated June 5, 1992. A copy thereof is attached.
3.

Denied.

The judgment was for thirty (30) days or until

Petitioner purged himself by paying $2,000 to plaintiff for past
due child support, alimony and attorney's fees or unless otherwise
discharged.
4.
5-7.

Admitted.
Denied.

The Court found in prior evidentiary hearings

Petitioner had the ability to pay.

-7

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 92C-0748A
Page 3
8-11.
12A-D.

Admitted.
Denied.

Civil contempt proceedings of the trial court

are presumptively valid, were imposed for only thirty (30) days and
were purged by Petitioner upon payment of $2,000. The substance of
Petitioners allegations are clearly refuted by the Memorandum of
Points

and

Authorities

filed

in the Utah

Supreme

Court

in

opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ, a copy
of which is attached hereto.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the

writ.
RULE 5 STATEMENTS
Pursuant to Rule 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Court, Respondent states as follows:
1.

Petitioner requested a stay of the contempt order pending

appeal and exhausted that remedy through the Utah Supreme Court.
Said request appears to have raised the issues which could have
been raised in a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
2.

Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal in Salt Lake

County District Court, however no further steps hctve been taken in
furtherance of said appeal, no briefs have been filed and no
transcripts have been ordered.
3.

All

proceedings

before

the

Trial

Court

have

been

reported; however, Respondent has determined Petitioner has failed
to make financial arrangements with the Court reporter for payment.
Only two partial transcripts are available for January 7, 1992 and
May 18, 1992. No evidentiary hearings have been transcribed.

a

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 92C-0748A
Page 4
4.

Certain transcripts of proceedings have been supplied by

counsel for Plaintiff and are attached hereto. Copies of pleadings
filed in the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme court are also
attached.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Petition, Respondent
requests the same be dismissed or Respondent be dismissed from the
action or such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 25th day of September, 1992
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

Martin Verhoef, #332S/
Deputy Salt Lake Cbunty Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
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PETITION UNDER 28 USC § 2254 FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY
District

AO 241 (Rev. 5/85)

IBmtefc g>tate0 iiatrict (tart
SJame
J e r r y S i l v e r O s ^ u t h o r p e . __ ._
Place of Confinement
S a l t Lake County J a i l

Prisoner No.

Name o f Petitioner (include name under which convicted)

Jerry Silver

Case No.

Name o f Respondent (authorized person having custody of petitioner)

Osguthorpe

V. Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff, Salt Lake Co.

The Attorney General of the State of:

PETITION
1. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack T h i r d J u d i c i a l
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

2. Date of judgment of conviction

District

J u n e 1 9 1 1992

3. Length of sentence 30 d a y s " a n d s u c h l o n g e r t i m e a s t h e c o u r t deems f i t t o i m p o s e ^
s e n t e n d e " u n t i l P e t i t i o n e r pays t h e d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t and a l i m o n y .
4. Nature of offense involved (all counts) F a i l u r e t o p a y c u r r e n t and d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t
and alimony•

5. What was your plea? (Check one)
Since this matter was never treated as a criminal
proceeding no official plea was ever taken. Petitioner
(a) Not guilty
•
maintained, however, that he had the inability to pay
(b) Guilty
•
the amount required by the court.
(c) Nolo contendere
•
It you entered a guilty plea to one count or indictment, and a not guilty plea to another count or indictment, give details:

6. If you pleaded not guilty, what kind of trial did you have? (Check one)
(a) Jury
•
The May 18, 1992 hearing was not an evidentiary trial,
(b) Judge only
D
Judge Wilkinson ruled o n a n Order to Show Cause.
7. Did you testify at the trial?
Yes D No D

Petitioner, unrepresented by counsel, made statements
to the court but did not do so under oath.

8. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction?
Yes S No D

fO\

AO 241 (Rev. 5/85)

9. If you did appeal, answer the following:

(a) N a m e of court

Utah Court o f Appeals

__

(b) R^nit

Court o f appeals refused to issue stay pending appeal a n d remanded t o
trial court f o r award of a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s ,
(c) Date of result and citation, if known
July 16, 1992
_
(d) Grounds raised Improper p r o c e d u r e ; failure to conduct a n evidentiary hearing a s to
ability to pay; failure to enter legally sufficient findings a n d conclusions of
law; stay should b e granted b e c a u s e of irreparable
h a r m if sentence i s allowed
=
t 0 proceed.
^
(e) It you sought turther review ot the decision on appeal by a higher state court, please answer the following:
(1) Name of court
(2) Result

(3) Date of result and citation, if known
(4) Grounds raised

(t) If you filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, please answer the following with respect to
each direct appeal:
(1) Name of court
(2) Result

:

(3) Date of result and citation, if known
(4) Grounds raised

10. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions,
applications, or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or federal?
Yes _ N o D
11. If your answer to 10 was "yes," give the following information:
(a) (1) Name of court

U t a h Supreme C o u r t

(2) Nature of proceeding

E x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t r e q u e s t e d i n t h e n a t u r e of mandamus,

supersedeas a n d c e r t i o r a r i .
Improper p r o c e d u r e ; failure to conduct a n evidentiary hearing
(3) Grounds raised

as to a b i l i t y to pay: f a i l u r e to enter l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t

findings a n d conclusions of law; stay should b e granted b e c a u s e of
irreparable h a r m if sentence w a s allowed to proceed.

AO 241 (Rev. 5/85)

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
Yes D No H
The U t a h Supreme Court: d e c l i n e d t o g r a n t any r e l i e f
(5) Result
p.xp.fMif.ion of t h e s e n t e n c e ,
(6) Date of result

staying

the

A u g u s t 1 7 , 1992

(b) As to any second petition, application or motion give the same information:
(1) Name of court
(2) Nature of proceeding

(3) Grounds raised

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion?
Yes D No D
(5) Result
(6) Date of result
(c) Did you appeal to the highest state court having jurisdiction the result of action taken on any petition, application or
motion?
(1) First petition, etc.
Yes • No E
(2) Second petition, etc.
Yes • No S
(d) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did not:

Since the petition was brought in the Utah Supreme Court there was no other
avenue of appeal,

.

12. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly thefacts supporting
each ground. If necessary, you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.
CAUTION: In order to proceed in the federal court, you must ordinarily first exhaust your available state court remedies
as toeach ground on which you request action by the federal court. If you fail to set forth all grounds in this petition, you may
bejbarred from presenting additional grounds at_ajater_date.

AO 241 (Rev. 5/85)

For your information, the following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds for relief in habeas corpus proceedings.
Each statement preceded by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. You may raise any grounds which you
may have other than those listed if you have exhausted your state court remedies with respect to them. However, you should
raise in this petition all available grounds (relating to this conviction) on which you base your allegations that you are being
held in custody unlawfully.
Do not check any of these listed grounds. If you select one or more of these grounds for relief, you must allege facts. The
petition will be returned to you if you merely check (a) through (j) or any one of these grounds.
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession.
(c) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest.
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to
the defendant.
(g) Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy.
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury which was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled,
(i) Denial of effective assistance of counsel,
(j) Denial of right of appeal.
A. Ground one: Petitioner was denied federal due process of law in that his conviction
for criminal contempt did not involve any criminal procedural protections.

Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law) Petitioner was found guilty of criminal
contempt in May of 1992.

He was never advised that this was a criminal

proceeding, was not advised as to the right of counsel or to appointment of
counsel, was not advised as to the right to remain silent or the right to call
or confront witnesses.

In short* this matter was treated as purely civil in

nature even though a criminal sentence was imposed.

Ground two* Petitioner was denied substantive due process rights in that there
was no evidence taken to establish that Petitioner has the ability to comply
with the Court's order but willfully refused to do so.
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): The May 1992 hearing was not an
evidentiary trial.

Instead, it was in the nature of an Order to Show Cause at

which time Petitioner, representing himself, merely made statements to the Court
as to his inability to pay.
placed under oath.

No witnesses were called and neither party was

The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing of any type

violates procedural due process.

The failure to produce any substantial

evidence of ability to pay violates substantive due process.

A O 241 (Rev. 5/85)

C. Ground three:

Petitioner's right to due process was also violated by failure to

inquire as to his financial status for appointment of counsel as to a civil
contempt proceeding.
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): During the May hearing, no effort was
made to inquire as to whether Petitioner wished counsel appointed to represent
him for civil contempt which could result in an unlimited sentence of
incarceration.

D. Ground four The failure of the State courts to grant a stay of the jail sentence
pending appeal renders any such appeal ineffective to protect the constitutional
rights of Petitioner.
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): Petitioner's present incarceration f 01
criminal and civil contempt will continue for thirty days plus any additional
time the state court judge wishes to impose upon Petitioner.

Under the

procedures of appeal in Utah, Petitioner will serve all of his jail time months,
if not years, before a decision of its imposition will be made.

13. If any of the grounds listed in 12A, B, C, and D were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, state briefly
what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them: The argument i n D
has never been presented to a state court since it is a particularized claim
for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.

Petitioner has no other state remedy

available to stay the imposition of the sentence pending appeal.
14. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack?
Yes S No D
15. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who represented you in the following stages of the judgment attacked
herein:
^XSS^PSXgSS^^aSig Craig S. Cook. 3645 East 3100 South, represented Petitioner
after the contempt proceeding had occurred. He has represented Petitioner in the
Utah Court of Appeals and in the Utah Supreme Court.
(b) At arraignment and plea

A0 241 (Rev. 5/85)

(c) At trial

(d) At sentencing

(e) On appeal

(f) In any post-conviction proceeding

(g) On appeal from any adverse ruling in a post-conviction proceeding

16. Were you sentenced on more than one count of an indictment, or on more than one indictment, in the same court and at the
same time?
Yes D No D
N/A
17. Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack?
Yes D No D
N/A
(a) If so, give name and location of court which imposed sentence to be served in the future:

(b) Give date and length of the above sentence:

(c) Have you filed, or do you contemplate filing, any petition attacking the judgment which imposed the sentence to be
served in the future?
Yes D No D

Wherefore, petitioner prays that the Court grant petitioner relief to whichlhe may be entitled in thk proceeding.

Signature of Attorney (if any)

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on

(date)

Signature of Petitioner

a\
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

HfcCEIVED

STATE OF UTAH

AUG 2 0 1992

332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

''jan. Adamson & Dor .ova i

84114

AUGUST 17, 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Sharon A. Donovan
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys at Law
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,
Pet.i tioner,
v.
Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe,
The Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court, State
of Utah; Judges Judith
Billings, Russell W. Bench,
Norman H. Jackson, Judges of
the Utah Court of Appeals,
Respondents.

No. 920368

In the absence of an adequate foundation the petition for
extraordinary writ is denied. In addition the motion for a stay
of execution is also denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

EXHIBIT "B"
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Respondent, Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
oOo
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES

v.
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
THE HONORABLE HOMER F.
WILKINSON, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court, State
of Utah; JUDGES JUDITH
BILLINGS, RUSSELL W. BENCH,
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges of
the Utah Court of Appeals,

Case No- 920368

Respondents.
-oOoCOMES NOW the Respondent, Jeanette Osguthorpe, and hereby
submits this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
the Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ, This Memorandum
is supplemental to Respondent's Response to Motion to Stay Bench
Warrant and/or Issue Writ of Supersedeas Pending Review by Law and
Motion Panel filed in this Court on August 10, 1992 (hereinafter
referred to as "Respondent's Response").

That Response sets forth

in detail the statement of facts relied on in this Memorandum.

The

trial

court

also

provided

adequate

findings

as

reflected in the bench ruling and the Orders to show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the elements of contempt were met, namely "that
the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the
ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so."
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172.
The Court of Appeals did not abuse it discretion in
finding that Petitioner's appeal is not likely to prevail on its
merits.

Respondent respectfully requests that the Petition for

Extraordinary Relief be denied, that no stay of the jail sentence
be granted and that Respondent be awarded her attorney's fees and
Court costs herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

13 —

day of August, 1992.

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

B

y.OV^KAA^\ 6^.
SHARON A. DONOVAN
Attorneys for Respondent

»
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe,

T

. *oonan
sr* c: ihs Court
Utah Court of Appeals

ORDER DENYING STAY
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 920395-CA
v.
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson (Law and Motion).
This case is before the court on appellant's motion for stay
pending appeal. Based upon the memoranda filed by the parties
and oral argument before the court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal
is denied, and the temporary stay previously granted is vacated,
based upon the court's determination that appellant has not
sufficiently demonstrated that he would be likely to succeed on
the merits of the appeal. See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d
10'26, 1027 (Utah App. 1987) (per curiam), and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded
to the trial court for determination and entry of an award of
appellee's costs and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in
opposing the motion for stay.
/ / #

Dated this /£

day of July, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

U2L

dith M. Billings,

ge

JUN24392
r

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

'TNoonan
Lof the Court
Utsh Court of Appeals.

Jeanetter Crawford Osguthorpe,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 920395-CA
v.
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe,
Defendant and Appellant.

This case is before the court on appellant's motion for a
staying the imposition of a jail sentence upon defendant for
contempt of court pending a determination on appeal or, in the
alternative, until a full hearing can be held on the motion for
stay.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a temporary stay of the imposition
of the jail sentence is granted, which shall continue until a
further order of this court, and
IT IS
motion for
this court
#400, Salt

FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on the merits of the
stay is scheduled before the law and motion panel of
on July 15, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. at 230 South 500 East,
Lake City Utah, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this temporary stay shall have no
effect on the ongoing obligations of defendant/appellant to make
any child support, alimony, or other payments under the orders of
the trial court previously entered in this matter.
Dated this

z#&ay of June -34, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

&yjg*^/
Russell W. Bench, Judge

~ n r\ *>

CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
Attorney for Defendant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: 485-8123

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHROPE,
MOTION FOR STAY OF
JAIL SENTENCE PENDING
APPEAL

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

No.
District Ct. No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant-Appellant «

Defendant Jerry Osguthorpe pursuant to Rule 8 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure moves this Court for an order
staying the imposition of a jail sentence upon Defendant for
contempt of court until such time as this matter has been heard
by this Court on appeal or, in the alternative, until a full
hearing can be held concerning this Motion for Stay.
This motion is based upon the following:
1.

An ongoing dispute for several years concerning the

divorce and terms of divorce has occurred between the plaintiff
and the defendant.
2.

As a result of this dispute Defendant has been ordered

to pay a large amount of accrued child support and alimony to the
plaintiff.
3.

In January of 1992 the lower court issued an order that
-1-

Defendant was to be incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail if
he did not pay $5,000 toward these arrearages by January 13, 1992
and to continue to pay the sum of $900 per month each month
thereafter.
4.

On January 13, 1992 Defendant did pay to the plaintiff

$5,000 which was obtained from Valley Bank & Trust Co. in the
form of a loan signed by the defendant and his current wife.
5.

On May 18, 1992 a further hearing was held before the

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson concerning the defendants failure
to make payments in accordance with the Court's schedule. At
that time the Court found Defendant in contempt of court and
sentenced him to the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty
days "and such longer time as the Court deems fit to impose
sentence" if the defendant did not pay an additional $2,000 by
May 26, 1992 as well as continue to make the $900 per month
payment as scheduled.
6.

During all of these proceedings Defendant has

represented himself since he has been unable to afford counsel.
7.

Because of certain procedural irregularities the parties

stipulated that the prior Order of May 18, 1992 could be vacated
and that a new order executed on June 19, 1992 would take effect.
Under the terms of this Order Defendant is ordered to be
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty
days and such longer time as the Court deems fit if the defendant
is unable to pay $3,050 by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon.
8.

The Affidavit of Defendant attached herein states that

he is unable to meet this financial obligation because he does
-2-

not have the funds available to pay this amount under the Court's
time table•

Furthermore, the Affidavit of Defendant establishes

that he is acting in good faith in attempting to settle this
matter with his wife but that he is financially unable to meet
the economic schedule established by the Court.

Further, the

Affidavit of Defendant together with supporting notarized
statements of other veterinarians supports his position that he
is not under-employed and is making a wage which is not
inconsistent with other veterinarians doing his type of work in
this depressed market.
9.

The attached Affidavit of Counsel Craig S. Cook is filed

to support the reasoning as to why this request for stay on
appeal has not first been formally made to the lower court.

As

stated in the Affidavit the lower court has imposed numerous
contempt of court sentences upon the defendant and has issued
stays based upon various events.

In speaking with the lower

court on June 19, 1992 the Court stated that it would be
extremely unlikely to grant a stay on appeal unless some
significant new evidence concerning Defendant's financial
condition was presented to the Court.

Since there is no new

financial information that the Court has not already seen and
rejected it is counsel's opinion that there is no likelihood that
a stay pending appeal would be granted by the lower court.
Moreover, the lower court is now sitting in Summit County during
this week and is unavailable for a timely hearing.
Based upon this motion, therefore, Defendant requests the
following relief: (1) for a stay entered by a judge or judges of
-3-
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this Court preventing the imposition of the incarceration that
has now been ordered by the lower court as of June 24, 1992 at
12:00 noon and continuing such stay until the appeal in this case
has been decided by this Court; or (2) in the alternative, for an
order issued by a judge or judges of this Court staying
imposition of the jail sentence until such time as this matter
concerning a stay on appeal may be fully argued to a panel of
this Court•
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992.

alg p.yCook
f. j
Craig
torney for DefendantAttorney
Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Stay of Jail Sentence
Pending Appeal to Sharon A.

Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310

South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 this 24th
day of June, 1992•

lo^Jad^
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
Attorney for Defendant
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: 485-8123

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHROPE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
JERRY OSGUTHROPE

APPEAL

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

No.
District Ct. No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant-Appellant.

1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case and have

been involved in this continuing dispute with my former wife
since our separation in 1988. The terms of my divorce have been
before this Court on a previous occasion in Case No.
which was decided on March 19, 1990, 131 Utah Adv.Rpt.
2.

890219
21.

I have been representing myself since this Court's

decision on appeal because I have been financially unable to
afford an attorney.

On numerous occasions I have been found in

contempt of the court for failure to make the required payments
under the Divorce Decree but such jail sentence has been stayed
pending my fulfillment of the financial obligation.
3.

In January of 1992 I again was ordered to go to jail

unless I was able to provide $5,000 to my wife before January 13,
1992.

In order to meet this obligation my current wife and I
-1-
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took out a loan from Valley Bank & Trust for $5,000 and paid her
this amount prior to the imposition of the jail sentence.
4.

Since that time I have been making payments of $500 a

month to my ex-wife the last one being on June 2, 1992 but these
amounts are not sufficient to comply with the Court's Order of
$1,050 a month which includes child support, alimony, and back
payments.
5.

I have now been ordered to pay $3,050 to my ex-wife by

June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon or to report to the Salt Lake County
Jail.

I have again attempted to borrow this money from Valley

Bank but as evidenced by the attached letter of Nori Dustman,
Assistant Vice President of Valley Bank, I am unable to obtain
any further loans.
6.

During the hearing of May 18, 1992 and on previous

occasions I have testified to the Court that I am presently
making an adjusted gross income of approximately $14,000 as a
contract veterinarian and that I simply am unable to meet the
payment schedule created by the Court.

I have attached notarized

letters of three other veterinarians who support my contention
that under the market in Salt Lake today that this is not an
unreasonable wage and that I am not under-employed as continually
alleged by my former wife and as found by the lower court.
7.

I have submitted to the Court copies of my recent

federal tax returns which verify my income and my inability to
meet these schedules.

The Court has seemingly ignored these

documents and has continued to impose a financial obligation upon
me which I cannot meet.
-2-

8.

I do not have any other assets or income available to

meet this obligation of some $3,000 by today nor will I be able
to meet the $1,050 obligation per month in the future•
9.

I presently, under the terms of the Divorce Decree, have

all four of my children living with me and my current wife
throughout the summer.

It is therefore necessary for me to

support them at home while at the same time paying my former wife
for the child support and delinquent amounts even though they are
not living with her during this three-month period•
10.

If I am forced to stay at the Salt Lake County Jail for

thirty days or more as now ordered by the lower court I will lose
any income that I could have earned during this period as a
veterinarian as well as alienate many of my clients who I will be
unable to service-

In addition, my current wife and my four

children will not have sufficient income available to support
them during my incarceration.
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992.

J/
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the 24th day of June, 1992, personally appeared before me
Jerry Osguthrope who duly acknowledged that the contents of the
foregoing Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
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'••!•' SS.000.00

loan Date"
"",| 1-13-1B92

Maturity

9IMICMCNI

Collateral

loan; No ,

Mil. in" ' '

'

Accourtt

Officer

um&% a

i'

References in the shaded area are for Lender's use only and do not hmit the applicability of this document to any particular loan or item

Borrower: JERRY S. OSGUTHORPE

Lender:

GWENDA OSGUTHORPE
4696 HIGHLAND OR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64117-5135

Total of
Payments

CHARGE

The cost of my credit
as a yearly rate.

The dollar amount the
credit will cost me.

The amount of credit provided
to me or on my behalf.

The amount I wBl have paid
after I have made all payments
as scheduled.

$941.20

$5,000.00

$5,941.20

1 c]p

1 want an itemization.

C]

i

I do not want an itemeatiou.

PAYMENT SCHEDULE. Mypayme nt schedule wilt be 60 monthly payments of $99.02 each, beginning February 13,1992.
SECURITY. 1 am giving a securityinterest in Branch 00202 0000000047383125 PASSBOOK SAVINGS in addition to Lander's security inter© ft
nd other rights in my deposit accoiunts.

I LATE
P CHARGE.

1

Amount
Financed

PERCENTAGE RATE

1 6.998%

1

Valley Bank and Tnuit Company
BROADWAY OFFICE
ao WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64101-0000

If a payment is 11 days late, I vrin be charged 5.000% of the payment or $15.00, whichev*ir Is greater.

PREPAYMENT, it I pay oft early, hrill not have to pay a penalty.

will look at my contract docume nts for any additional imfonmation about
1 1cheduled
date, and prepayment refunds and penalties.
8

nonpayment, default, any lequired repayment In fun before tte

I

I read and was given a competed copy of this Dtedosure Statement on January 13,1992, prior to signing the Note.
BORROWER:

Other Charges Paid IfrCaah:
Fixtd Rttt Installment.

$0.00

:

LASER PRO(tm)Vtr. 3.131(c) l99?CI l'B*fik»r«S«n<nw Group, Inc. AJIj^Mjr»t#rv«d.[U>-IBlOF3,14P3.13 0tn»f*t»d bytht Customtr Sonnet Syilim.LN]

uiscjosing-orticer signature And omcerNumoer

JB

|

'•*••

r-%i^ i

BROADWAY OFFICE
BO WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 14101-0000

June 22, 1992

DR. JERRY OSGUTHORPE
6808 COURTLAND AVENUE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121-0000

Dear DR. OSGUTHORPE:
In viewing your request, I am sorry to inform you that we
will be unable to process your request.
We feel that you have excessive obligations and insufficient
income to support any further debt at this time.
If circumstances should change in the future, we will be
glad to re-evaluate your request.
If you have any further questions, or would like to discuss
this matter further, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

STATE OF UTAH
NORI DUSTMAN
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT
A
County of.
BROADWAY OFFICE
(801)481-5350

W Y

rf<Uc^

>t«
Lua-s.

AD. B - £ - L personalty

the signer
appeared before me ' T Y ^ - w
kCu^ttf- » T > t ^ ^ T
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me
that
v-> i> <• flvflmtArt ihe same,
r
My commission expires:
7 - - * 3JL

Notary Public

Residing at

3247 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
(801) 485-6060

J. Britt Hosken, D.V.M.

6/23/92
To Whom It May Concern,
This will state that I pay a relief veterinarian
$115.00 per day for a 9 hour shift.

This veterinarian

is an independent contractor who uses my staffs facilities and supplies.
The availability of jobs is a very limited market
here in the Salt Lake area and competition among the
various veterinary clinics is fierce keeping wages and
salaries low for veterinarians and all staff.

Sincerely,
S5/)Y~^
J . B r i t t Hosken, D.V.M.
PTA1EOFUTAH

RMkfingtf:
TVmmnm.^

)

-

NotvyPubfe
\
CH«Et*LETTA
I
455 E s t Sotrih Tofnpte I
BaUtetCHy,UtthC4l1i:
My Commission Expwts I
July 15,1933
I

C\

ANIMAL CARE CLINIC
5484 South 900 East
Murray, Utah 84117
(801) 266-1219

Earnest J. Heward DVM
June 23, 1992
To Whoir. I t Hay Cor.corr.:

I curror.tr.- ' - i l l per,- ' 'CS.CC-lCS.Ce per day for a full

ti^e
:r.clur:\--wly nnall ar.ir.al veterinary
rr»^"Vn.
T ^ ** S ^ - ~«V s* * h - hour shift ard the doctor us- c.
: I'Z^Z'.
The doctor is e::pacted to
assure r.a^CLcerl-I -y;- .mc;.o;.nihilities \:hile ir. the practice*
The daily rr.to o: ;-^y :....t .3
; i-isod o.-. their level of experience
:
ard ability i:i 1:1:« : .:rct.\d• z\.i r.cnacer.er.t of a solo srr.all
c :

ia«L Ci.'.i:lCa« ^ .^»-,— w w «

r.wlie:: '/or* :.o J : ? . 3 C , :1 a/.i a doctor performing this type
of v:or:: car 3::/oct co have r-orioCs of ti±e v;her. they are not
c:. ^ I c i d .

YocSAyriA •£,„.

->.- Hrj:t. * - • - -.6./

?

<7 f

WHITC PINE VETERINARY

CLINIC

P.O. BOX 18U, PARK CITY. UTAH 14060

Telephone 801-649-7182
801-32K657

June 23, 1992

Dear Sirs,
This will state that I pay a relief veterinarian
$110.00 per day for a 9 hour shift.

This veterinarian

is an independent contractor who uses my staff, facilities
and supplies.

Sincerely,

k^actUf?. <$wdwM
Keith S. Lund, DVM

OFITTAH

WX»i2.per»n*y

Onthe^f^ L f hyrtf()f^
eft '•ed before me -

H

^

<*

acknowledge"/to \me

c. .he \ within inetrument. who
,

^

^

"

•taUry Public

Kycoi
Betiding g :

_ Notify Public
LEANORA.DUSr.V.:!
2855Ecst3C:0S:Ji
SaJtLetoC(i7.UtrhJ;0

My Ccmmis^lrn &:f.nz
U2czmtzr2dt MM
St£3CfU£h

SHARON A. DONOVAN, 0901
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: 521-6383

JUN1S1992
SAL1 L/UV£ wwut* • v

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT
IN CONTEMPT AND IMPOSING
JAIL SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,

Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, attorneys' fees and
immediate imposition of jail sentence came on regularly for
hearing on May 18, 1992 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff
appearing in person and by and through Sharon A. Donovan on
behalf of Kent M. Kasting, and Defendant appearing pro se, and
the Court having heard evidence and during the proceedings having
received documentary evidence regarding Defendant's income,
Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2.
Pursuant to such hearing an Order was entered by the Court
on June 5, 1992 finding the defendant in contempt and imposing a
jail sentence and judgment.

Because of procedural irregularities

-1-

the parties have stipulated that such Order should be withdrawn
and that a new Order should t?: .ssued in Order to allow the
defendant the opportunity

e appropriate action with

reference to such Order.
The Court considers itself very familiar with the file of
this case, having had numerous proceedings before this Court
prior to the above-referenced hearing.

The Court has carefully

listened to the profer and evidence of the parties and reviewed
prior testimony of the parties regarding prior imposition of jail
sentence and considers itself fully advised in the premises.
Based upon the foregoing, and the Court having made and entered
adequate and sufficient Findings of Fact, now, therefore, the
Court being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Court finds that this matter has been before this

Court before, has been up to the Court of Appeals on one occasion
and that Court has sustained this Court, and the Court finds the
defendant's income, as he states, is just not realistic.
2.

The Court finds that the parties9 children need to be

supported and Defendant has failed to meet his obligations,
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
3.

The Court sustains its previous order.

The Court

further orders that Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Salt
Lake County Jail for a period of thirty days, and such longer
time as the Court deems fit to impose sentence, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-32-12, if the acts performed as ordered by
this Court are not fully complied with.

However, the Court will

stay its imposition of jail sentence, as long as the following
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay this Order until the
June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, at which time $3,050.00 shall be
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent child
support and alimony through June 1992 ($1,800.00 in child support
through June 1992, and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992; and
attorneys9 fees of $500.00 for purpose of these proceedings).

If

the the $3,050.00 is not paid by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a
bench warrant shall issue, unless the defendant submits himself
to the Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration.

(b) The Court

further orders that if the on-going child support and payment on
arrearages of $900.00 per month due on the 5th day of July,
1992 is not paid at that time, a bench warrant shall issue,
unless Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the Salt Lake
County Jail.

(c) If Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the

Salt Lake County Jail, he is ordered to inform this Court of
such, so that the necessary paperwork can be taken care of. 43)
Judgment shall enter against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff in
the amount of $1,800.00 in delinquent child support through June
1992; $750.00 in alimony through June 1992 and attorneys1 fees of
$500.00 for purposes of these proceedings, for a total judgment
of $3,050.00.
DATED this

12.
day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
/HOMER F. WILKINSON
/ District Judge
-3-
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1

(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED

2

IN OPEN COURT:)

3

THE COURT:

LET ME INDICATE TO YOU THAT I'M NOT

4

GOING TO GO BACK OVER WHAT I SAID THE LAST TIME, EXCEPT TO

5

EMPHASIZE THAT THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN UP BEFORE THE

6

COURT OF APPEALS ON ONE OCCASION, THAT THE COURT SUSTAINED

7

THIS COURT, AND THAT THE COURT INDICATED THE SAME AS THIS

8

COURT HAS, THAT THE DEFENDANT'S INCOME AS STATED BY HIM IS

9

JUST NOT REALISTIC.

10

THE COURT OF APPEALS TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE

11

UNKNOWN AMOUNTS OF INCOME—THAT THERE WAS AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF

12

INCOME THAT THIS COURT HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, AND IT

13

WAS JUSTIFIED IN DOING SO, AND NO MATTER HOW YOU LOOK AT IT,

14

WE STILL HAVE CHILDREN THERE THAT DO NEED TO BE SUPPORTED.

15
16
17

WE HAVE A MARRIAGE OF A CERTAIN DURATION WHERE
ALIMONY HAS BEEN_AWARDED. AND IT HAS NOT BEEN-KEPT—UP-,
^^^

THIS COURT IS GOING TO SUSTAIN ITS ORDER PREVIOUSLY.

18

/THE COURT IS GOING TO ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT BE INCARCERATED

ly

IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS, AND SUCH

20

LONGER TIME AS THE COURT SEES FIT TO IMPOSE PURSUANT TO

i
\1
78-32-12, IF THE ACTS ARE NOT PERFORMED AS ORDERED BY THIS
22 \^COURT.
23
24
25

THE COURT WOULD—NOW THIS AMOUNT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME
IS THROUGH MAY?
MS. DONOVAN:

THAT'S CORRECT.

Jt

1
2

THE COURT:

THE COURT WOULD STAY THE ORDER—ARE

THOSE SUPPOSED TO BE PAID AT THE FIRST OF THE MONTH?

3

MS. DONOVAN:

4

THE COURT*.

THE 5TH AND THE 20TH, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT WOULD STAY THIS ORDER UNTIL

5

THE 26TH DAY OF MAY AT 12 O'CLOCK NOON, AT WHICH TIME $2,000

6

SHALL BE PAID BY THE DEFENDANT, AND THAT WOULD INCLUDE

7

BRINGING THE CHILD SUPPORT FOR MAY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AND

8

ALIMONY FOR MAY AND PROVISION FOR COMING BEFORE THIS COURT.

9

AND EACH TIME THIS MATTER IS BROUGHT BACK, THERE ARE

10

GOING TO BE ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES, MR. OSGUTHORPE.

11

SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT.

12

26TH BY 12 O'CLOCK NOON OR A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED,

13

UNLESS THE DEFENDANT SUBMITS HIMSELF TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY

14

JAIL FOR INCARCERATION.

15

YOU

AND THAT $2,000 IS TO BE PAID BY THE

THE COURT WOULD FURTHER NOTE THAT IF THE AMOUNT DUE

16

AND OWING ON THE 5TH OF JUNE IS NOT PAID BY THAT TIME—AND

17

THAT AMOUNT WOULD BE HOW MUCH IS DUE?

18

EACH MONTH?

19
20

MS. DONOVAN:

$900 CHILD SUPPORT.

THAT INCLUDES

ARREARAGES.

21
22

AND I'M SPEAKING OF

THE COURT:

$900, IF THAT IS NOT PAID BY THE 5TH OF

JUNE, A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED.

23

THAT'S GIVING YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THIS

24

CURRENT BY THE 26TH, AND THEN CURRENT THROUGH THE MONTH OF

25

JUNE.

AND IF IT'S NOT DONE, AS I SAY, A BENCH WARRANT WILL
3

57

1

ISSUE, UNLESS YOU SUBMIT YOURSELF VOLUNTARILY TO THE COUNTY

2

JAIL.

3

I WOULD INDICATE TO YOU THAT IF YOU DO SUBMIT

4

YOURSELF VOLUNTARILY, THAT YOU DO INFORM THIS COURT OF SUCH SO

5

THAT THE NECESSARY PAPERWORK CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF.

6

QUESTIONS?

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THIS INCOME, YOUR HONOR?

1

THE COURT:

ANY

WHERE AM I GOING TO COME UP WITH

MR. OSGUTHORPE, PAYMENT OF MONEY IS YOUR

W

RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED ON YOU BY THIS COURT AND

l\

BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

12

NOT TELLING YOU WHAT TO DO.

13
14
15
16

AS I INDICATED TO YOU BEFORE, I'M
YOU ©0 WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO.

BUT WHATEVER YOU DO, AS FAR AS ANY FURTHER APPEAL OR
ANY MODIFICATION, THAT WOULD BE YOUR DECISION.
THAT'S THE ORDER OF THE COURT.

WOULD YOU PREPARE

THE PLEADINGS?

17

MS. DONOVAN:

18

THE COURT:

I WILL.
AND GET THEM OVER TO ME AS SOON AS

19

POSSIBLE, AND A COPY TO MR. OSGUTHORPE.

20

CONCERNING THE ORDER?

21

MS. DONOVAN:

22

THE COURT:

ANY QUESTIONS

NO, YOUR HONOR.
IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, THEN

23

THAT WILL BE THE ORDER.

24

THAT THE COURT DOES ADMIT DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NOS. 1 AND 2.

25

FOR THE RECORD, LET ME ALSO INDICATE

(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.)

3«

KENT M. KASTING (1772)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN RE:
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC.
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER,
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
CONTEMPT CITATION

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 874904967
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
oooOooo
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on
EXHIBIT "E"
* *

Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m.

The

The plaintiff was

present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart,
Adamson & Kasting.
himself pro se.

The defendant was present and represented

The parties presented testimony and documentary

evidence and argument in support of their respective positions.
Each party was sworn and testified under oath.

The Court

reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the
premises.

The Court issued its ruling from the bench and has

made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based upon the

foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER.

Defendant's

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt
Order and Sancrions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as
proposed and without modification.
2.

DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S

RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991.

Defendant's Rejection of

Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she
agreed to relinquish.

2

to

3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE.

Any personal property to be

exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992.
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present.
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property
to which he may be entitled.

Following that exchange the issue

of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal
property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

Plaintiff's

claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to
Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Plaintiff

has waived her right to seek reimbursement from defendant for the
children's nedical and dental expenses from January 4, 1991
through September 25, 1991, the date which she filed her motion
seeking such reimbursement.
5.

JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

Plaintiff

is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750,
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January
1992.

This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for

unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court.
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES.

Plaintiff is granted judgment

against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This
3

4!

W^75
judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys
fees previously entered by the Court.
7.

SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT. The Court imposes the following

sanctions on defendant for his contempt:
a.

The defendant is fined $200.

b.

The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the

Salt Lake County Jail.
c.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and
ability to perform.

He shall continue to serve the time in jail

until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court.
d.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code

Annotated. (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children,
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so.
e.

The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a

period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992.

If by that time

defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support
arrearages reduced to judgment in ^5 above.

If he fails to pay

the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If

A

nx

he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued tor m &
arrest.
f.

Further, in addition to and independent of the

requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and
$300 towards support arrearages).

Should defendant not make

these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence
serving such sentence.

This $900 monthly payment shall continue

until all child support arrearages have been paid.

It shall be

in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce.
g.

Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has

been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in 5s (e)
and (f) above.
DATED this X f day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT

f

/HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Approved as to Substance and Form:

.Q

SA^/-

Date

Kent M. Kastmg
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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KENT M. KASTING (1772)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV IN RE:
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS,
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC.
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S
#
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO
.*\
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, /•''
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF V '•
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND
•>/ '
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
• •*,
CONTEMPT CITATION
" '

JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE,
Plaintiff,
v.

JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 874904967

.;"' '-'J"

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
oooOooo
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on

.i . i

J
t v J

.,

Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m.

The

The plaintiff was

present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart,
Adamson & Kasting.
himself pro se.

The defendant was present and represented

The parties presented testimony and documentary

evidence and argument in support of their respective positions.
Each party was sworn and testified under oath.

The Court

reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the
premises.

The Court issued its ruling from the bench and now in

connection with that ruling now makes the following Findings of
Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

NOTICE.

Both parties had proper notice of these

proceedings and the Court has jurisdiction over each of these
parties.

Defendant had the opportunity for a full hearing on

Plaintiff's Request for Contempt.
2.

OBLIGATIONS UNDER DECREE OF DIVORCE.

The defendant at

all times knew and understood the obligations imposed upon him
under 5s 4, 6, 7 and 15 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this
matter.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Disputes as to the exchanges of

personal property have arisen between the parties in the past and
those disputes have not been able to be voluntarily resolved by
the parties.

Any such disputes are independent from, and not

related to, the defendants ongoing obligations to pay plaintiff
2

us

Plaintiff has in the past attempted to make arrangements for the
orderly exchange of this property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

The defendant

has challenged plaintiff's claims for reimbursement of medical
and dental expenses not covered by insurance.

Those unreimbursed

expenses through January 4, 1991 were reduced to judgment in
connection with previous hearings held before the Commissioner
and this Court.

With regard to unreimbursed medical and dental

expenses incurred after January 4, 1991 through September 25,
1991, the date of the filing of plaintiff's last Motion,
plaintiff stated she would not seek reimbursement from defendant
for the same.
5-

UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
a.

Defendant has failed to pay ongoing child support

and alimony for considerable periods of time (See plaintiff's
Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5). Between December 1990 and January 1992,
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child support, $2,100 in
alimony (total $10,500 plus accrued interest).

Defendant paid

$750 leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See plaintiff's
Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for January, 1992.)

No child support has

been paid since February, 1991.
b.

Defendant and his current wife both testified "He

would pay child support if his personal items were returned".
c.

Defendant further testified the plaintiff had

plenty of money and could sell one of her houses.

3
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d.

Defendant has not demonstrated good faith in

connection with attempting to pay his ongoing support
obligations,
e.

Defendant testified he was paying his new wife $500

per month rent in order to reside with her in a home she recently
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.
f.

Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of

15 years and testified he earned $5.00 per hour in connection
with consultation he claimed he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal
Hospital.

Defendant had and has the means to pay child support.
g.

The credibility of the defendant and his present

wife is lacking.

Both refused to answer questions on the stand.

Both were evasive.

The defendant did not answer questions

truthfully.
h.

The defendant's failure to pay his support

obligations as previously ordered was done willfully, voluntarily
and with full knowledge of those obligations as previously
ordered by the Court.
6.

CONTEMPT.

The Court finds the defendant is in contempt

of this Court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended), in that he has been disobedient of lawful
jnr^gmca**^—orders and prot^s^^^^^Y^^TiTsHSbur^

The defendant had

the opportunity to have a full hearing and evidence has been
taken regarding that contempt.

The defendant has not answered

the questions put to him truthfully.

The Court specifically

finds that this is one of the most flagrant violations of the law
4

as far as support of children that has come before this Court, in
that the defendant owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid
child support alone.

Defendant is further in contempt for his

failure to pay alimony and attorneys fees as previously ordered
by the Court.
7.

ATTORNEYS FEES.
a.

The defendant has paid nothing towards the

attorneys fees he was previously ordered to pay by this Court in
connection with the trial of this matter and his subsequent
appeal of this Court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals.
b. t The plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees and costs
in connection with this hearing and will be required to pay those
fees.
c.

Plaintiff does not have the financial means to pay

d.

Plaintiff's counsel bills at the rate of $125 per

her fees.

hour.

That rate is consistent with rates charged in the

community for domestic relations work.

Plaintiff's counsel

expended in excess of 7 hours in connection with preparation for
and attendance at the hearing.

The rate charged and hours

expended are reasonable and necessary.

Plaintiff's counsel

requested an award of $87 5 in attorneys fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes the
following:

5
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER.

Defendant's

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as
proposed and without modification.
2.

DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S

RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991. Defendant's Rejection of
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she
agreed to relinquish.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE.

Any personal property to be

exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11# 1992.
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present.
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property
to which he may be entitled.

Following that exchange the issue

of personal property shall be fully/ finally and completely
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal
property.
4.

UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES.

Plaintiff's

claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to
6

Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Plaintiff by

stipulation has waived her right to seek reimbursement from
defendant for the children's medical and dental expenses from
January 4, 1991 through September 25, 1991, the date which she
filed her motion seeking such reimbursement.
5.

JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

Plaintiff

is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750,
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January
1992.

This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for

unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court.
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES.

Plaintiff is granted judgment

against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This
judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys
fees previously entered by the Court.
7.

SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT.

The Court imposes the following

sanctions on defendant for his contempt:
a.

The defendant is fined $200.

b.

The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the

Salt Lake County Jail.
c.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and
ability to perform.

He shall r^nntjnije to serve the time in jail

until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court-

so

d.

Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code

Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance
with the Court1s Orders and the need to support his children,
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so.
e.

The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a

period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992.

If by that time

defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support
arrearages reduced to judgment in 55 above.

If he fails to pay

the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If
he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his
arrest.
f.

Further, in addition to and independent of the

requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and
$3 00 towards support arrearages).

Should defendant not make

these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence
serving such sentence.

This $900 monthly payment shall continue

until all child support arrearages have been paid.

It shall be

in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce.
8
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g.

Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has

been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in fs (e)
and (f) above.
DATED this

day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT

HONORABLE HOMER F- WILKINSON
District Court Judge

Approved as to Substance and Form:

a- XL***—

Htsh

-ft-^Kent M.Hasting
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Date
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1

THE COURT:

WELL, YOU TAKE THE S375 THAT WAS

2

P A I D , A N D O F C O U R S E N O N E W A S P A I D IN J A N U A R Y , A N D G O I N G B A C K

3

TO WHERE HE HADN'T PAID FULL CHILD SUPPORT BACK I GUESS TO

4

ALMOST THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE, IT LOOKS LIKE BACK IN MARCH OF

5

1969, THAT THERE IS AN AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT--AND THIS WOULD

6

H A V E T O B E D E T E R M I N E D A C C U R A T E L Y - - B U T I T ' S U P IN T H E A M O U N T O F

7

$16,000.

8
9

NOW I'M N O T T A L K I N G A B O U T A L I M O N Y OR A T T O R N E Y S
F E E S , I'M L O O K I N G O N L Y AT C H I L D S U P P O R T , T H A T H E ' S H A D T H E

](>

M E A N S TO PAY T H I S C H I L D S U P P O R T A N D T H A T H E H A S A G O O D

11

E D U C A T I O N , HE HAf. T H E AE'.II.ITY T O , IF H E D O E S N O T HAVE T H E

12

I N C O M E - - A N D T H E C O U R T EVEN Q U E S T I O N S T H A T - - T H A T HE IS P A Y I N G

K'.

FOR R E N T IN AN E X C E S S I V E AMOUNT I N S T E A D O F P A Y I N G H I S C H I L D

14

SUPPORT.

15

T H E C O U R T F I N D S T H A T T H I S IS O N E OF T H E H O S T

16

F L A G R A N T V I O L A T I O N S O F T H E LAW AS FAR AS S U P P O R T OF C H I L D R E N

17

T H A T H A S C O M E B E F O R E T H I S C O U R T , A N D AS I S A Y , I C A N N O T EVEN

18

C O M P R E H E N D HOW A F A T H E R C A N ALLOW H I M S E L F T O D O SUCH A T H I N G

19

A N D S T I L L CLAIM H E L O V E S H I S C H I L D R E N A N D W A N T S T O V I S I T T H E

20

CHILDREN.

21

THE COURT WOULD ORDER, PURSUANT TO SECTION

22

70 32-10--AND OF COURSE I'VE INDICATED HE HAS BEEN FOUND II

2?.

CONTEMPT--THAT HE BE FINED 5200, AND THAT HE BE ORDERED TO

i>9

S P E N D 30 DAYS IN T H E SAJLULAJCE C O U N T Y

2 5.

JAIL.

T H E C O U R T WOjJi^-F-URJHER O R D E R , P U R S U A N T T O

$1

SECTION 78-32-12 THAT THE IMPRISONMENT IS FOR HIS OMISSION TO
PERFORM AN ACT ENJOINED BY LAW, WHICH HE IS YET IN THE POWER
TO PAY, AND THAT AFTER SERVING THE 30 DAYS, HE IS TO CONTINUE
TO SERVE THE TIME IN JAIL UNTIL HE PAYS THE CHILD SUPPORT AS
ORDERED BY THE COURT.
THE COURT WOULD FURTHER ORDER THAT THE COURT
WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO SECTION
78-32-12.1(5), THAT IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT--IF
THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT WOULD
BENEFIT FROM PERFORMING COMMUNITY SERVICE, AND PARTICIPATE IN
WORKSHOP CLASSES OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE HIM ABOUT
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT'S ORDERS, AND TO
PROVIDE HIS CHILDREN WITH A SUBSTANTIAL SOURCE OF SUPPORT,
THEN THE COURT MAY ORDER THAT IF THE COURT SEES FIT.
THE COURT WILL FURTHER ORDER THAT THE PRISON- OR, THE JAIL SENTENCE WILL BE STAYED FOR A PERIOD OF SIX DAYS
OR UNTIL THE 13TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1992, THAT IF THE DEFENDANT,
BY THAT TIME, HAS PAID THE SUM OF 55,000 TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR
CHILD SUPPORT, THEN THE SENTENCE WILL BE STAYED AND EACH MONTH
THEREAFTER THAT HE PAYS CHILD SUPPORT AS ORDERED BY THE COURT,
PLUS THE SUM OF S300 TOWARDS THE ARREARAGE--OR FOR AN AMOUNT
OF S900--THEN THE JAIL TERM WILL BE STAYED.
IF HE FAILS TO PAY THE 55,000 BY THE 13TH DAY
OF JANUARY, 1992, THEN HE IS TO REPORT TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
JAIL AT 12 O'CLOCK NOON.

IF>ttr"EDES NOT REPORT, A BENCH

WARRANT WILL BE ISSUED FOR HIS ARREST.
I WOULD ASK THE PLAINTIFF TO PREPARING THE
PLEADINGS.

ANY OUESTIONS?
MR. KASTING:
THE COURT:

NO, YOUR HONOR, AND I WILL.
ANY OUESTIONS?

MR. OSGUTHORPE:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

I'M A LITTLE

CONFUSED ON THIS--HOW MUCH I HAVE TO PAY OR--.
THE COURT:

YOU HAVE TO PAY, BY JANUARY 13TH--

YOU HAVE TO PAY THAT BEFORE 12 O'CLOCK NOON.

LET ME COUNT MY

DAYS.
MR. OiiGUTHORPE:
THE COURT:

PAY TO THE PLAINTIFF?

WAIT A MINUTE.

I HAVE GIVEN SIX

DAYS, YOU HAVE TO PAY THAT TO THE PLAINTIFF BY THE 13TH,
OTHERWISE REPORT TO THE JAIL ON JANUARY 14TH AT 12 O'CLOCK
NOON OR A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED.
MR. OSGUTHORPE:
THE COURT:

THEN $900 AFTER THAT?

$900 A MONTH THEREAFTER.

THAT

WOULD BE $600 ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT AND $300 UNTIL THE
ARREARAGE IN CHILD SUPPORT IS CAUGHT UP.
AFTER THE ARREARAGE OF CHILD SUPPORT IS CAUGHT
UP, THEN OK COURSE IT GOES BACK TO THE $600 A MONTH.

OF

COURSE IF THE CHILDREN BECOME OF AGE, THEN OF COURSE THAT'S
SOMETHING, TOO.
MR. KASTING:

YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO THE

ONGOING ALIMONY OBLIGATION OF $150, THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION
12
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1

WOULD BE 3750 A MONTH, S600 FOR CHILD SUPPORT--.

2

THE COURT:

THE ALIMONY WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID,

3

TOO; I'M JUST NOT ORDERING THAT THAT BE PAID AS FAR AS THE

4

JAIL.

5

FAR AS THE OBLIGATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND ALL THE ORDERS OF

6

THIS COURT; AND THAT SHOULD BE NOTED FOR THE RECORD.

7

HE'S IN CONTEMPT OF THIS COURT AS FAR AS ALIMONY AND AS

BUT I AM PURGING HIM OF THE CONTEMPT IF HE'S

8

PAID THE CHILD SUPPORT AND GETS THE CHILD SUPPORT GOING, AND

9

WHAT YOU DO AS FAR AS THE COLLECTION OF ALIMONY, I'LL HAVE TO

10

LEAVE THAT TO YOU.

11

MR. KASTING:

12

THE COURT:

13

OKAY, YOUR HONOfc.
IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS,

COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.

14

(WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 4:.35 P.M., THE

15

PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.)

16
17
18
19
20

(TRANSCRIBED BY NANCY BURR)

21
22
23
24
25
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APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES TO THIS APPEAL
Amendment 5, United States Constitution:
No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of
law....
Article 1, Section 7, Utah State Constitution:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article 1, Section 12, Utah State Constitution:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.
Article 1, Section 16, Utah State Constitution:
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in
cases of absconding debtors.
Section 78-32-1, Utah Code Annotated:
The following acts or omissions in respect to a
court or proceeding therein are contempt of the
authority of the court:
* * *

(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment,
order or process of the court.
Section 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated:
...When contempt is not committed in the immediate
view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an
-57-

affidavit shall be presented to the court or judges of
the fact constituting the contempt, or a statement of
the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other
judicial officers.
Section 78-32-4, Utah Code Annotated:
...When the contempt is not committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court or judge a
warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person
charged to answer, or, without a previous arrest, a
warrant of commitment may, upon notice, or upon an order
to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of commitment
can be issued without such previous attachment to
answer, or such notice or order to show cause.
Section 78-32-9, Utah Code Annotated:
When the person arrested has been brought up or has
appeared the court or judge must proceed to investigate
the charge, and must hear any answer which the person
arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses
for or against him; for which an adjournment may be had
from time to time, if necessary.
Section 78-32-10, Utah Code Annotated:
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall
determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty
of the contempt charge. If the court finds the person
is guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine
not exceeding $200, order the person imprisoned in the
county jail not exceeding 30 days, or order both fine
and imprisonment....
Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated:
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action
or special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights
therein, is caused by the contempt, the court,, in
addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for the
contempt or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of
money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his
costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of
money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved
party for such loss and injury.
Section 78-32-12, Utah Code Annotated:
When the contempt consists in the omission to
perform an act enjoined by law, which is yet in the
power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned
until he shall perform it, or until released by the
court, and in such case the act must be specified in the
warrant of commitment.

